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INTRODUCTION
Asbestos personal injury litigation has been the mother of all
mass torts. It has overwhelmed state and federal court dockets for well
over a decade, while leaving many claims unsatisfied, and costing
some $7 billion,' with billions more to follow. 2 For these reasons, it
has also been the mother of invention. Among the many reforms
I Christopher F. Edley & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-Billion Dollar Crisis, 30
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 383, 390 n.12 (1993) (citing Suzanne L. Oliver & Leslie Spencer, Who
Will the MonsterDevour Next, FoRBs, Feb. 18, 1991, at 75, 79).
2 JudgeJack B. Weinstein, who has played a large role in managing asbestos personal
injury litigation, has estimated that pending and future personal injury claims will likely
cost between $26 and $28 billion. See In rejoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. (Findley v.
Blinken), 129 B.R. 710, 907 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992). See
generally Asbestos Litigation Crisis in Federal and State Courts: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Property andJudicial Administration of the House Comm. on theJudiciaq, 102d Cong.,
1st & 2d Sess. (1991-92) [hereinafter Litigation Crisis].
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prompted in part by the personal -injury litigation was the widespread
adoption of the discovery rule for applying the statute of limitations.3
The plight of victims of latent diseases highlighted the shortcomings
of a rule that extinguished their causes of action before they reason-
ably could have known they were injured.4 Courts and legislatures
responded with the discovery rule, which postpones the accrual of a
cause of action until the plaintiff discovers the injury.5
In the last fifteen years, courts and legislatures have confronted a
second wave of asbestos litigation: claims by building owners for prop-
erty damage caused by asbestos. As with the first wave, the question of
how to apply the statute of limitations-that is, when does the clock
start ticking-has proven difficult in asbestos property damage cases.
Courts have struggled in applying the discovery rule to these cases,
producing inconsistent outcomes and confusing doctrine.6
The importance of the statute of limitations issue comes into
sharp focus in the national class action, In re Asbestos School Litigation,
7
filed on behalf of some 35,000 private and public schools.8 The court
in this class action has yet to address the statute of limitations question
comprehensively, the resolution of which may very well negate a large
number of the schools' claims. To date, asbestos property damage
cases not part of this class action have typically involved millions of
3 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-5.5 (Bums 1992) (adopting discovery rule for
causes of action involving asbestos-related injuries); Susan D. Glimcher, Statutes of Limita-
tions and the Discovery Rule in Latent Injury Claims: An Exception or the Law, 43 U. Prr. L. REv.
501, 522 (1982) ("[A]doption of a discovery rule by judicial or legislative enactment thus
becomes merely a nominal concession to the ever-increasing numbers of toxic substances
victims.").
4 See, e.g., Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 430 N.E.2d 1297, 1299 (N.Y. 1981)
(Fuchsberg, J., dissenting); cf. Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in
Toxic Substances Litigation, 76 CAT_ L. REv. 965, 970 (1988) (asbestos personal injury plain-
tiffs "frequently run afoul of the statute of limitations").
5 See, e.g., N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & K. 214-c (McKinney 1990) (adopting discovery rule
after repeated invitations by the New York Court of Appeals); Glimcher, supra note 3, at
502 (growing number ofjurisdictions adopting the discovery rule); Green, supra note 4, at
976 (describing widespread adoption of the discovery rule); Gideon Mark, Comment, Is-
sues in Asbestos Litigation, 34 HASTNGs LJ. 871, 881 (1983) (majority of courts apply discov-
ery rule; some jurisdictions have adopted discovery rule by legislative enactment);John K.
Strader, Note, Preserving Causes of Action in Latent Disease Cases: The Locke v. Johns-Manville
Corp. Date-of-the-Injury Accrual Rule, 68 VA. L. REv. 615, 624 (1982) (discovery rule probably
the majority rule in latent disease cases).
6 See discussion infra part I.B.2.
7 In reAsbestos Sch. Litig., No. 83-0268 (E.D. Pa. filedJan. 17, 1983). Approximately
500 colleges and universities are included in a separate class action against manufacturers
of asbestos-containing products. See Central Wesleyan College v. W.R. Grace & Co., 143
F.R.D. 628 (D.S.C. 1992) (class action conditionally certified), afTd, 6 F.3d 177 (4th Cir.
1993).
8 See In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., No. 83-0268, 1990 WL 73000, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 25,
1990) (national class action includes over 35,000 not-for-profit elementary and secondary
schools).
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dollars in judgment or settlement costs.9 The stakes are high for the
defendant asbestos manufacturers and for the school boards which
must, in the end, find away to pay for expensive asbestos abatement.10
Part I of this Note considers the different rules that courts and
legislatures have formulated for determining when statutes of limita-
tions and statutes of repose apply and when they begin to run. It
surveys the causes of action usually asserted by building owners and
explains their impact on limitations periods. Part II describes the
prominent role of state legislation that preempts normal statute of
limitations rules by reviving stale claims or by immunizing building
owners from the consequences of their failure to file timely claims.
That Part concludes with a discussion of the role sovereign immunity
plays in asbestos property damage litigation."
Part III analyzes the discovery rule, the prevailing accrual rule for
tort-based causes of action and concludes that the discovery rule suf-
fers from irreducible vagueness when applied to asbestos property
damage cases. This Part discusses why complying with statutes of limi-
tations has been a persistent problem for plaintiff building owners
and why this issue is so consistently litigated. 12 This Part argues that
statutes of limitations have necessarily influenced substantive theories
of legal liability and have forced plaintiffs to choose causes of action
and theories of product defect that make recovery more difficult.
9 See Kansas City v. W.R. Grace & Co. (Kansas City fl), Nos. WD45130, WD45144,
WD45276, 1992 WL 202510, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1992) (jury verdict in favor of city
in the sum of $14.25 million); Rowan County Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co.,
418 S.E.2d 648 (N.C. 1992) (plaintiff awarded $1.8 million verdict); Dennis Cassano, State
Settles Asbestos Claims Firms to Pay $11 million, STAR TRIB., Feb. 10, 1989, at 1B (State of
Minnesota settles lawsuit against several asbestos companies; settlements in the case totaled
$14 million); Lydia Villalva Lijo, School Wins Asbestos Lawsuit, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS Dis-
PATCH, OCt. 6, 1990, at 8A ($3.3 million verdict); 1992's Largest Verdicts Asbestos: Property
Damage, NAT'L LJ.,Jan. 25, 1993, at S4 ($23.2 million verdict awarded in first phase of City
of Baltimore v. Keene Corp.; plaintiff seeking $45 million in next phase of trial against manu-
facturers of thermal asbestos insulation); Wayne Wangsted, Northstar Owners Win $19.7 Mil-
lion Judgment W.R Grace to Appeal4 ST. PAUL PIONEER PREss, Dec. 22, 1993, at lB (owners of
17-story building awarded $19.7 million verdict against W.R. Grace).
10 Cf Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liability for Asbestos Removal Costs, 73 OR. L. REv. 505,
511 (1994) (cost of removing asbestos from schools and public buildings estimated at $55
billion); Suzanne L. Oliver & Leslie Spencer, Wo Will the Monster Devour Next?, FORBES,
Feb. 18, 1991, at 75, 79 (cost of removing asbestos in buildings estimated at $100 billion).
11 Many jurisdictions allow public entities to circumvent statutes of limitations via the
sovereign immunity doctrine. See discussion infra part U.C.
12 Commentators and those close to the asbestos property damage litigation recog-
nize that the statute of limitations is the most significant barrier to recovery. See KuSTN
OLSON, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ASBESTOS ABATEmENT 13 (1986) (noting the "special problem" of
statutes of limitations in asbestos property damage actions); Arthur A. Schulcz, Comment,
Recovering Asbestos Abatement Costs, 10 GEo. MASON U. L. REv. 451, 459 (1988) (analyzing
difficulty of recovering for asbestos abatement costs in Virginia due to statute of limita-
tions); Barbara M. Christensen & Kristine A. Larscheid, Note, Asbestos Abatement: The Second
Wave of the Asbestos Litigation Industry, 27 WASHBURN L.J. 454, 491 (1988) ("The real threat
to plaintiffs' ability to recover asbestos abatement costs are statutes of limitations.").
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That is, the statute of limitations shapes the entire lawsuit, forcing
plaintiffs to construct a theory of liability around the time-bar prob-
lem. Part III maintains that although important policies motivate the
discovery rule, it yields disparate results in similar situations and fails
to provide adequate guidance to building owners who seek to preserve
their rights.
This Note proposes a more formal discovery rule, one that sets
forth specific facts that must be ascertained before a cause of action
accrues. Specifically, a tort cause of action for asbestos property dam-
age should accrue when an expert notifies the plaintiff building
owner of: (1) the presence of asbestos in the building, (2) the general
dangers of asbestos, and (3) the need to maintain or remove the as-
bestos-containing material. This rule would produce predictable out-
comes and would fairly balance the interests of plaintiffs and
defendants. The impact of this litigation on the public and the liti-
gants justifies a specialized procedural rule that addresses the difficul-
ties in applying statutes of limitations to asbestos property damage
cases.
I
THEORIES OF LIABILIY AND THE ACCRUAL OF THE CAUSE OF
ACrION
A. A Sketch of the Asbestos Property Damage Action
To understand the legal issues underlying the statute of limita-
tions problem in asbestos property damage suits, it is necessary to un-
derstand the facts leading up to a typical suit. Generalizations are
appropriate in this context because many of the relevant facts are
common to most of these lawsuits. 13 Asbestos has long been used in
products where its fire-resistant and insulating properties are
needed. 14 During World War II, great quantities of asbestos were
13 The similarities among the many asbestos property damage suits are especially sali-
ent when considering the statute of limitations issue. Of course, differences in the types of
asbestos-containing products involved in these cases will undoubtedly influence other as-
pects of the lawsuit, such as the plaintiff's proof of product defect in a tort cause of action.
See, e.g., Appletree Square 1 Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 815 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Minn. 1993)
(suit involving sprayed asbestos fireproofing applied to steel beams of office buildings),
affid, 29 F.3d 1283 (8th Cir. 1994); Cinnaminson Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co.,
552 F. Supp. 855 (D.N.J. 1982) (action to recover costs of removing asbestos-containing
acoustical plaster used in the ceilings of school buildings).
14 See MINES BRANCH, CANADIAN DEPT. OF INTERIoR, ASBESTOS: ITS OCCURRENCE, Ex-
PLOrrATION AND USES 125-48 (1905) (describing commercial applications of asbestos, in-
cluding its use, after 1878, in asbestos cloth, theater curtains, rope, wall plaster, and
pipecovering); Lee S. Siegel, Note, As the Asbestos Crumbles: A Look at New Evidentiary Issues
in Asbestos-Related Property Damage Litigations, 20 HOFsrRA L REV. 1139, 1140 (1992)
(describing asbestos as "an important fire retardant since the time of Caesar").
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used in the boiler rooms of warships,15 and one of the most common
uses of asbestos since 1946 has been as sprayed-on fireproofing and
insulation. 16 Between 1946 and 1973, asbestos products gained great
popularity in the construction of educational and commercial build-
ings. 17 These are the buildings that are at issue in the asbestos prop-
erty damage litigation. 18 The products at issue include asbestos
15 See Edley & Weiler, supra note 1, at 387.
16 FRANK B. CROSS, LEGAL RESPONSES TO INDOOR AIR POLLUTION 24 (1990).
17 See University Sys. of N.H. v. United States Gypsum Co., 756 F. Supp. 640, 649
(D.N.H. 1991). William J. Nicholson of the Mt. Sinai School of Medicine surveyed office
buildings that contained asbestos-containing materials. He estimated that one-half of all
new office buildings constructed between 1958 and 1970 used a sprayed-on asbestos fire-
proofing that was applied to the steel beams. Id. Note the important role played by this
type of product: it adhered to the skeleton of the building and helped to protect it from
fire. See also Abatement of Asbestos in D.C. Public Schools: Oversight Hearing on Problems Related
to Asbestos and its Abatement in D. C. Public Schools Before the Subcomm. on judiciay and Education
of the House Comm. on the District of Columbia, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1984) (statement of
Edward A. Klein, Director, TSCA Assistance Office, Office of Toxic Substances, U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency) ("asbestos-containing materials were applied to walls, ceil-
ings, and structural components of certain buildings" between end of World War II and
1973); OtsoN, supra note 12, at 2 (asbestos first used in schools after World War II; tens of
thousands of tons of asbestos used in schools and colleges between 1946 and 1973); DON-
ALDJ. PINCHIN, ASBESTOS iN BuILDINGS: A STUDY PREPARED FOR THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON
MATrERS OF HEALTH AND SAFETYARISING FROM THE USE OF ASBESTOS IN ONTARo 3.7 (1982)
("use of sprayed asbestos was most widespread" in Ontario from 1950 to 1973); LindleyJ.
Brenza, Comment, Asbestos in Schools and the Economic Loss Doctrine, 54 U. CHI. L REv. 277,
277 (1987) (noting the use of asbestos as a structural material during the middle of the
20th century); Siegel, supra note 14, at 1141 (discussing "broad use of asbestos in structures
since the 1940s").
18 See Concordia College Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 999 F.2d 326,328 (8th Cir. 1993)
(college buildings completed between 1957 and 1970), cert. denied 114 S. Ct. 926 (1994);
First United Methodist Church v. United States Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 864 (4th Cir.
1989) (church constructed in 1961 and 1962), cert. dnied, 430 U.S. 1070 (1990); Wesley
Theological Seminary of the United Methodist Church v. United States Gypsum Co., 876
F.2d 119, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (seminary buildings constructed between 1957 and 1960),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990); City of Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 827 F.2d 975, 976
(4th Cir. 1987) (city hall building completed in 1971 and 1972); Appletree Square 1 Ltd. v.
W.R. Grace Co., 815 F. Supp. 1266, 1268 (D. Minn. 1993) (office building completed in
1974), affd, 29 F.3d 1283 (8th Cir. 1994); Roseville Plaza Ltd. v. United States Gypsum Co.,
811 F. Supp. 1200, 1202 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (shopping center constructed in the early
1960s), affd, 31 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 1994); Heider v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 89 C 9067, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10239 (N.D. Ill.July 15, 1992) (warehouse constructed in 1967); Cheshire
Medical Ctr. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 764 F. Supp. 213, 214-15 (D.N.H. 1991) (medical center
constructed between 1971 and 1972); Independent Sch. Dist. No. 197 v. W.R. Grace & Co.,
752 F. Supp. 286, 289 (D. Minn. 1990) (school building completed in 1971); Security
Homestead Ass'n v. W.R. Grace & Co., 743 F. Supp. 456 (E.D. La. 1990) (office tower built
during 1970 to 1971); Cinnaminson Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 552 F.
Supp. 855 (D.NJ. 1982) (schools built between 1959 and 1964); Celotex Corp. v. Saint
Joseph Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 880, 881 (Ga. 1989) (hospital renovation during 1969 to 1970);
Kansas City II, Nos. WD45130, WD45144, WD45276, 1992 WL 202510, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App.
Aug. 25, 1992) (airport terminals constructed between 1969 and 1972); Rowan County Bd.
of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 359 S.E.2d 814, 815 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (construc-
tion of schools during 1950 and 1961); Beavercreek Local Sch. v. Basic, Inc., 595 N.E.2d
360, 363 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (schools constructed during 1955 and 1962); Kershaw
County Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 596 S.E.2d 369, 370 (S.C. 1990) (schools
1995] NOTE-ASBESTOS PROPERTY 701
thermal insulation for boilers, 19 asbestos pipecovering,20 asbestos
floor tile,21 asbestos ceiling tile,22 and sprayed-on asbestos
fireproofing.
23
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Another dimension of asbestos property damage cases is the
growing awareness of the dangers of asbestos products just as they
gained maximum popularity during the 1950s and 1960s. Plaintiff
building owners' knowledge of these dangers is crucial in statute of
limitations analysis. 24 The process of learning about the hazards of
asbestos began early. Indeed, it is often noted that even the ancient
built 1956-58); University of Vt. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 565 A.2d 1354, 1355 (Vt. 1989) (ath-
letic fieIdhouse converted into a central heating facility in 1970 to 1971). Most asbestos
property damage actions have been filed since 1984. See Asbestos Information Clemringhouse:
Hearing on H.R. 5078 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerc , 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1986) (statement of Richard
P. Brown,Jr., on behalf of United States Gypsum Co.) (indicating that the first asbestos-in-
buildings case was brought in 1980, and that large numbers of cases have since been
brought, beginning in 1982 to 1983).
19 See, e.g., University Sys. of N.H., 756 F. Supp. at 643 (One group of defendants sup-
plied asbestos "thermal (pipe and boiler) insulation.").
20 See, e.g., id.
21 See, e.g., id. at 643 n.5 (plaintiff's suit originally included manufacturers and sellers
of floor tile products; these defendants had settled with the plaintiff at the time of the
court's opinion).
22 See, e.g., Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 15 v. United States Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915,
916-17 (8th Cir. 1993); Adams-Arapahoe Sch. Dist. No. 28-J v. United States Gypsum Co.,
No. 91-1046, 1992 WL 58963 (10th Cir. Mar. 23, 1992); School Dist. of Independence v.
United States Gypsum Co., 750 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); First United Methodist,
882 F.2d at 864; Wesley, 876 F.2d at 120; Cinnaminson, 552 F. Supp. at 856; Beavercreek, 595
N.E.2d at 363; Kershaw, 396 S.E.2d at 370.
23 See, e.g., Appletree Square 1 Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 815 F. Supp. 1266, 1268 (D.
Minn. 1993), affd, 29 F.3d 1283 (8th Cir. 1994); Roseville Plaza Ltd. v. United States Gyp-
sum Co., 811 F. Supp. 1200, 1202 (E.D. Mich. 1992), aff'd, 31 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 1994);
Independent Sch. Dist. No. 197 v. W.R. Grace & Co., 752 F. Supp. 286, 288 (D. Minn.
1990); Security Homestead Ass'n v. W.R. Grace & Co., 743 F. Supp. 456, 457 (E.D. La.
1990); Uricam Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 739 F. Supp. 1493, 1494 (W.D. Okla. 1990);
Kansas City II, Nos. WD45130, WD45144, WD45276, 1992 WL 202510 (Mo. Ct. App. Aug.
25, 1992); Mt. Lebanon Sch. Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 607 A.2d 756, 757 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992); University of Vt. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 565 A.2d 1354, 1355 (Vt. 1989).
24 See discussion infra part I.B.2.
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Greeks understood the dangers associated with exposure to asbestos.25
Between the 1930s and 1978, when the EPA banned the use of
sprayed-on asbestos building materials,2 6 the scientific community dis-
covered many of the adverse health effects caused by exposure to as-
bestos.27 This increasing knowledge, however, was of the risks to
occupationally exposed workers.28 For a long time, experts believed,
and indeed some still contend today, that low-level exposure to build-
ing occupants posed no threat to human health.29 Therefore, in
1964, when scientists indisputably established the link between occu-
pational exposure to asbestos and cancer,3 0 the risks to building occu-
pants were simply not known. Finally, in the late 1970s, the EPA
concluded that asbestos in buildings may pose a health hazard.3 ' Yet,
25 See Lisa K. Mehs, Comment, Asbestos Litigation and Statutes of Repose: The Application
of the Discovery Rule in the Eighth Circuit Allows Plaintiffs to Breathe Easier, 24 CREIGHTON L.
Rxv. 965, 965 n.1 (1991).
26 See 43 Fed. Reg. 26,372 (1978) (EPA ban of virtually all spray application of asbes-
tos); see also National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 38 Fed. Reg. 8826
(1973) (sprayed materials containing more than 1% asbestos banned).
27 See PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT. THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL
14, 115-27 (1985); BARRY I. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 10-31
(1984) (describing how the scientific community discovered the disease of asbestosis); see
also BRODEUR, supra, at 199-204 (discussing development of five million particles per cubic
foot standard and role of 1938 Dreesen study).
28 See supra note 27.
29 See The Asbestos School Hazard Abatement Act of 1984-Oversight: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 104-05 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter 1985 Hearings] (written statement of Donald Dewees, Professor of Economics, Professor
of Law, University of Toronto) (citing four studies of asbestos fiber levels in buildings, the
earliest of which was conducted in 1975); see also BRODEUR, supra note 27, at 35, 136 (occu-
pational exposure to asbestos of five million particles per cubic foot considered acceptable
from 1938-1968).
30 See BRODEUR, supra note 27, at 30-31 (describing the results of studies conducted by
Dr. Irving Selikoff on the effects of asbestos exposure in industrial settings); IrvingJ. Se-
likoff & Herbert Seidman, Asbestos-Associated Deaths among Insulation Workers in the United
States and Canada, 1967-1987, in THE THIRD WAVE OF ASBESTOS DISEASE: ExPOSURE TO AS-
BESTOS IN PLACE 1-3 (Philip J. Landrigan & Homayoun Kazemi eds., 1991) (explaining
studies of occupationally exposed workers, including a 1964 Selikoff study linking lung
cancer to asbestos exposure) (citing Irvingj. Selikoff et al., Asbestos'Exposure and Neoplastia,
188JAMA 22 (1964)).
31 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ASBESTOS-CONTAINING MATERIALS IN
SCHOOLS BUILDINGS: A GUIDANCE DOCUMENT i (1979) [hereinafter EPA GUIDANCE Docu-
MENT] ("Until recently exposure to asbestos was generally considered an occupational
health hazard ... now we have learned of an equally serious exposure problem that can
occur in all types of buildings. .. ."); CRoss, supra note 16, at 28 ("[I]n the late 1970s,
governments and individuals began to notice the potential problem of indoor asbestos
exposure."); see also Detroit Bd. of Educ. v. Celotex Corp., 493 N.W.2d 513, 516, 519-20
(Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that the EPA barred the use of asbestos in buildings in 1978
and had instituted a program to warn school districts of the dangers of asbestos in build-
ings); Kansas City v. W.R. Grace & Co. (Kansas City 1), 778 S.W.2d 264, 270 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989) (observing that it was not until 1983 that OSHA determined that "there was no level
of exposure to asbestos below which clinical effects did not occur").
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even after these hesitant first findings, the dangers of asbestos are still
unclear and disputed.3 2
Use of Asbestos and Resulting Litigation
I I I I I I
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The typical asbestos property damage suit involves a plaintiff who
owns a large commercial building or a large number of educational
buildings constructed between 1946 and 1973. 3 These buildings con-
tain asbestos products, originally installed to carry out essential func-
tions.3 4 A progression of the plaintiff building owner's awareness of
an "asbestos problem" can be charted. Since the plaintiff is usually a
bureaucratic entity, such as a corporation or a school district, informa-
tion does not pass easily to the decisionmakers who would be responsi-
ble for commencing a lawsuit.35 The presence of asbestos is typically
the first fact known,36 followed by a general awareness of the dangers
32 Compare 47 Fed. Reg. 23,360 (1982) (EPA requires elementary and secondary
schools to inspect for friable asbestos; schools must achieve compliance by May 27, 1983);
L. Christine Oliver et al., Asbestos-Related Abnormalities in School Maintenance Personnel in THE
THIRD WAVE OF ASBESTOS DISEASE: ExPosuRE TO ASBESTOS IN PLAcE, supra note 30, at 521,
521-28 (studies indicating risks of asbestos exposure to building occupants) with Asbestos
School Hazard Abatement: Hearing on H. 3677 Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and
Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on EnWrgy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29
(1990) (statement of LindaJ. Fisher, Assistant Administrator for Pesticides and Toxic Sub-
stances, Environmental Protection Agency) (stating that "building occupants face only a
very slight risk" and taking issue with the "one fiber can kill" notion); CRoss, supra note 16,
at 29 ("[R]isk from indoor asbestos is several times lower than that presented by lightning,
tornadoes, hurricanes, and any number of other natural dangers; risk from exposure to
low levels of asbestos is speculative and uncertain."); id. at 27 ("For buildings with wet-
applied asbestos, nearly all measured concentrations were less than 0.0006 f/cc, which ap-
proximated outdoor levels."); Siegel, supra note 14, at 1146 n.45 (EPA rejects removal in
favor of management of in place asbestos) (citing National Emission Standards for Hazard-
ous Air Pollutants: Asbestos NESHAP Revision, 55 Fed. Reg. 48,406 (1990)).
33 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
34 See supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
35 See, e.g., City of Wichita v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F. Supp. 851, 866-67 (D.
Kan. 1993) (plaintiff argues that limitations period does not begin to run until city man-
ager and city counsel have notice of substantial injury, court holds that knowledge of lower
level employees may be imputed to the city); University Sys. of N.H. v. United States Gyp-
sum Co., 756 F. Supp. 640, 648-49 (D.N.H. 1991) (defendant argues that knowledge of
three "key players" should be imputed to the entire university system, an entity that owned
and operated some 150 buildings throughout the state).
36 The building owner may learn of the presence of asbestos very early, perhaps at the
time the building was constructed. See, e.g., Kansas City HT, Nos. WD45130, WD45144,
WD45276, 1992 WL 202510, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1992) (complaints about the
presence of asbestos raised during the construction of airport terminal buildings).
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of asbestos during the late 1970s or early 1980s.3 7 Thereafter, the
plaintiff may learn of flaws in the asbestos-containing material-chip-
ping, flaking, or erosions.38 The building owner may then learn of
"contamination" of the building, that is, the presence of airborne asbes-
tos particles in the environment.3 9 Finally, an expert hired by the
plaintiff or employed by a government agency may notify the plaintiff
building owner of the need to abate (remove or maintain) the asbes-
tos.40 This litany of facts usually comes to the plaintiff gradually, or
may be discovered all at once in an expert's report.
41
In this factual context, an asbestos property damage action must
be understood as an after-the-fact attempt to construct a theory of lia-
bility that avoids the statute of limitations. In light of these facts,
courts and legislatures must formulate rules governing statutes of limi-
tations and statutes of repose. This section examines the causes of
action commonly asserted and how each substantive basis of liability
affects the time-bar issue.
B. Accrual of the Tort Cause of Action
Tort causes of action (strict liability, negligence) are the primary
bases of liability in asbestos property damage actions. To determine
whether the statute of limitations bars the suit, the court must ascer-
tain "from when" the limitations period begins. According to the gen-
eral rule, the limitations period runs from the point at which the
cause of action "accrues."42 This section examines the common law
doctrines which have supplied the mechanism for fixing that point.
37 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
38 See, e.g., Kansas City 11, WD45130, WD45144, WD45276, 1992 WL 202510, at *5-*6
(city learned in 1975 of the flaking of asbestos fireproofing material applied to steel beams,
three years after construction of terminal building was completed).
39 See, e.g., Clayton Ctr. Assocs. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 861 S.W.2d 686 (Mo. Ct. App.
1998) (laboratory testing established the presence of airborne asbestos; court concludes
that plaintiff's cause of action accrued when airborne asbestos fibers were discovered).
40 See, e.g., Beavercreek Local Sch. v. Basic, Inc., 595 N.E.2d 860, 371-72 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1991) (recommendations made to plaintiff by local agency informing plaintiff that its
asbestos should be encapsulated was sufficient notice to start the statute of limitations pe-
riod running).
41 In Detroit Bd. of Educ. v. Celotex Corp., 493 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992),
the plaintiff building owner learned almost all of these elements simultaneously. Id. at 519-
20. In this case, the plaintiff commissioned a survey that established the presence of asbes-
tos as well as the need to remove it; the plaintiff acquired knowledge of the general dan-
gers of asbestos from other sources. Id. Plaintiff argued that it was unaware of its injury
until it received reports of the presence of airborne asbestos. Id. at 520. The court re-
jected this contention, persuaded by the fact that the plaintiff had submitted a funding
proposal for the "estimated costs of abatement" to the EPA before it received air sample
results indicating asbestos contamination. Id.
42 E.E. Woods, Annotation, Statute of Limitations: Wen Cause of Action Arises on Action
against Manufacturer or Seller of Product CausingInjury of Death, 4 A.L.R.3d 821 (1965) (citing
24 AM.JuR. Limitations of Actions § 113 (1941)).
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1. Date of Injury Rule
The traditional common-law rule started the statute of limitations
clock running from the "date of injury."43 Actual or constructive no-
tice to the plaintiff was irrelevant This approach often barred the
claims of those plaintiffs who concededly could not have complied
with the statute.44 The case law contains slim justification for this rule;
apparently the policy of repose outweighed even rudimentary fairness
to plaintiffs.45
Applying this rule turned on defining when the "injury" oc-
curred. Early asbestos personal injury cases exposed the difficulty of
determining the point of injury as well as the harshness of this rule.
In Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transportation Co.,46 for instance, the
plaintiff contracted pneumoconiosis47 after having been exposed to
asbestos dust while working for the defendant employer. The New
York Court of Appeals held that the three-year limitations period ran
from the point at which the plaintiff inhaled asbestos dust.48 Manifes-
tations of disease would not appear until years later, so actions seeking
damages for latent injuries of this sort were almost always time-barred.
The rule thus became: a "cause of action for negligence accrues when
there has been an invasion of personal or property rights."49 The im-
age of an "invasion" of a vested right became the key to pinpointing
the injury and deciding the statute of limitations question.
Latent injury cases, such as Schmidt, presented major problems in
defining the date of injury. For example, the ingestion of toxins may
result in disease, but only many years later.50 Likewise, the manifesta-
43 See Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 391 N.E.2d 1002, 1003 (N.Y. 1979) (citing Victor-
son v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 335 N.E.2d 275 (N.Y. 1975)).
44 See id.
45 In Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 430 N.E.2d 1297 (N.Y. 1981), the New York
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of claims brought by workers stricken with asbes-
tos-related diseases on statute of limitations grounds. The court held that the causes of
action accrued at the time of last exposure to the asbestos, not when the plaintiffs could
have known that they were sick. Id. at 1299. The court did not attempt tojustify the result,
but instead noted its unfairness and explicitly left it to the legislature to change the rule.
Id. Indeed, the dissent remarked that at first blush, "to state [the date of injury rule] would
appear to refute it." Id. Instead of taking the majority's deferential approach, the dissent
argued that the right result could be reached by ignoring the date of injury rule even
though it had been reaffirmed in many previous cases. Id. at 1300.
46 200 N.E. 824 (N.Y. 1936).
47 Pneumoconiosis is a disease of the lungs caused by the inhalation of dusts. Id. at
825. Today, the plaintiffs injury would be called asbestosis.
48 Id. at 828.
49 Durant v. Grange Silo Co., 207 N.Y.S.2d 691, 692 (App. Div. 1960) (citing Schmidt
and Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Lapp Insulator Co., 125 N.Y.S.2d 147 (App. Div. 1953)).
50 "The diseases associated with asbestos exposure are all characterized by long la-
tency periods." Mehs, supra note 25, at 965; see also CASTLEmAN, supra note 27, at 31
(describing the "inexorable progress" of asbestos disease).
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ion of symptoms may occur long after exposure. 51 Instead of fixing
the injury at the time of a disease's onset, which would attach a natu-
ral meaning to the word "injury" and avoid unfairness to plaintiffs, the
invasion of rights concept led courts to concentrate on when the
harmful substance entered the body.52 Under this theory, once a
toxin has entered the body, the plaintiffs rights have been invaded
and injury has occurred.5 3 This line of reasoning resulted in a debate
over whether the limitations period ran from the first or last expo-
sure.54 This controversy is divorced from the principal policies be-
hind statutes of limitation: fairness to plaintiffs and repose for
defendants.. The problems involved in applying this rule resulted
from the elusive "invasion" concept, not from any explicit considera-
tion of competing principles or values.
In property damage cases in which the damage resulted from a
single event, the date of injury rule did not pose much difficulty. In
Durant v. Grange Silo Co.55 and Great American Indemnity Co. v. Lapp
Insulator Co.,5 6 a silo and radio tower, respectively, collapsed. The in-
vasion concept fixed the date of injury at the time of collapse, rather
than when the structures were first built. The Lapp court reasoned
that the collapse marked the invasion of property rights. 57 Thus, in
these cases, the cause of action coincidentally accrued when the plain-
tiff learned of his cause of action, obtaining the same result that a
discovery rule would have reached. 58
In property damage cases in which the harm to the property is
not immediaLtely manifest, however, the date of injury is harder to de-
termine. In a case analogous to the asbestos property damage litiga-
tion, the New York Supreme Court in City of New York v. Lead Industry
Association, Inc.59 confronted the problem of setting the date of injury
in a suit alleging property damage due to the presence of toxic lead
paint in the city's buildings. The city sued for the abatement costs of
the lead paint. On a motion for dismissal on statute of limitation
grounds, the court held that the "injury occurred the first time the
paint was applied,"60 rather than when the city expended monies to
correct the health hazard. Again, the invasion concept proved criti-
51 See CAsruarMAN, supra note 27, at 31; Mehs, supra note 25, at 965.
52 See Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 391 N.E.2d 1002, 1003 (N.Y. 1979).
53 Id.
54 See Mehs, supra note 25, at 970-73.
55 207 N.Y.S.2d 691 (App. Div. 1960).
56 125 N.Y.S.2d 147 (App. Div. 1953).
57 Id. at 149.
58 See infra notes 256-76 and accompanying text.
59 No. 143651/89, 1991 WL 284454 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 23, 1991).
60 Id. at *3.
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cal. The court characterized the introduction of a toxic substance
into a building as an invasion of the plaintiff's property rights.61
Applied to an asbestos property damage case, the date of injury
rule would lead to an outcome similar to that reached in City of New
York The introduction of asbestos into a building parallels the facts of
a lead paint property damage case. Like lead paint, asbestos is a toxic
substance that does not manifest its potential as a health hazard until
many years after construction.62 Indeed, in University of Vermont v.
W.R. Grace & Co.,63 the trial court applied the date of injury rule and
concluded that the injury occurred at the time the asbestos-containing
materials were installed.6 4 In asbestos property damage cases, the in-
vasion concept effectively prevents a plaintiff from maintaining a
cause of action.
65
The date of injury rule is antiquated doctrine. Courts66 and legis-
latures67 have long lost their enthusiasm for a rule that eliminates a
61 Plaintiffs argued for the application of a discovery rule, enacted by the New York
legislature in 1986, but this rule expressly did not apply to acts or omissions prior toJuly 1,
1986. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & L 214-(6) (McKinney 1990). Several judicial opinions
before 1986 had hinted at a departure from the date of injury rule; see, e.g., Steinhardt v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 430 N.E.2d 1297 (N.Y. 1981) (Fuchsberg,J., dissenting) (in an asbes-
tos wrongful death case, arguing that prior New York date of injury cases do not support
the conclusion that the cause of action accrues at the point of exposure); NewYork Seven-
Up Bottling Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 466 N.Y.S.2d 478 (App. Div. 1983) (in an action involv-
ing a defective roof, the injury occurred at the time of product failure, not its installation).
The New York Court of Appeals, in what will be one of the last New York cases apply-
ing the date of injury rule, put to rest any notions that prior decisions had suggested any-
thing but a "first exposure" date of injury rule. See Snyder v. Town Insulation, Inc., 615
N.E.2d 999 (N.Y. 1993). The court in City of New York reached a similar conclusion in the
property damage context. The injury to the buildings occurred at the time that the build-
ings were first "exposed" to the toxic lead paint. City of New York, No. 14365/89, 1991 WL
284454, at *3.
62 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
63 565 A.2d 1354 (Vt. 1989).
64 Id. at 1355.
65 Corporation of Mercer Univ. v. National Gypsum Co., 877 F.2d 35 (11th Cir. 1989)
(applying Georgia law) illustrates the operation of the date of injury rule. In Mercer, plain-
tiff's buildings were constructed between 1906 and 1972. This meant that under the date
of injury rule the cause of action accrued no later than 1972, and that the limitations
period expired no later than 1976 under Georgia's four year statute of limitations. The
trial court first held that the discovery rule applied to plaintiff's claims and the case pro-
ceeded to trial. Corporation of Mercer Univ. v. National Gypsum Co., 24 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1953 (M.D. Ga. 1986). On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit certified the question to
the Supreme Court of Georgia of whether the discovery rule applied to property damage
cases. Corporation of Mercer Univ. v. National Gypsum Co., 832 F.2d 1233 (11th Cir.
1987). It held that the discovery rule was inapplicable to cases not involving bodily injury.
Corporation of Mercer Univ. v. National Gypsum Co., 368 S.E.2d 732, 733 (Ga. 1988). In
light of the Georgia Supreme Court's decision, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the
plaintiff's claims were time-barred, since it did not file suit until 1985. Mercer, 877 F.2d at
36.
66 See Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 430 N.E.2d 1297 (N.Y. 1981).
67 In 1986, New York overturned the common-law date of injury rule and statutorily
imposed a discovery rule in its place. See N.Y. Cmv. PRAc. L. & R. 214-c (McKinney 1990).
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cause of action as untimely even though the plaintiff may be entirely
faultless. The date of injury rule should be recognized as a mecha-
nism that generally precludes plaintiffs from recovering in latent in-
jury cases. It is a relic of formalistic legal reasoning, relying on the
elusive notion of an "invasion" of "personal or property rights,"68
rather than focusing on the competing policies behind statutes of lim-
itations. Application of the date of injury rule to asbestos property
damage suits would virtually immunize manufacturers from liability.6 9
While it advances the policy of repose-a legitimate concern in stat-
utes of limitations-the date of injury rule admittedly "causes hard-
ship,"70 failing to adequately consider fairness to plaintiff building
owners.
2. Discovery Rule
The discovery rule states that a "cause of action [in tort] accrues
when the plaintiff knew or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence,
should have known, of the injury."7' This rule is now the most preva-
lent.72 Either by statute or by judicial rulemaking, "the present trend
in most jurisdictions in products liability cases involving chemicals,
drugs and asbestos is to apply a variation of the discovery rule."73 This
rule moves away from the rigidity of the date of injury rule and seeks
to assure that a plaintiffs claim does not expire before the plaintiff is
aware of its existence. 74
Under this scheme, the plaintiffs knowledge of injury is critical.
Defining the injury is probably the most hotly contested issue under
the discovery rule, because knowledge of that injury is precisely what
triggers the start of the limitations period. Courts, including courts
68 See Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 200 N.E. 824, 827 (N.Y. 1936).
69 Since 1973, the EPA has drastically limited the use of asbestos for fireproofing and
insulation purposes. See Brenza, supra note 17, at 280 n.9 (citing 40 C.F.R1 § 61.22(e)
(1973)). The result is that no reported case has involved asbestos products installed after
that date. For a case involving one of the last buildings to contain sprayed-on asbestos, see
Appletree Square 1 Ltd. Partnership v. W.R. Grace & Co., 815 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Minn.
1993), afj'd, 29 F.3d 1283 (8th Cir. 1994). The building at issue in that case was completed
in 1974. Id. at 1269. The date of injury rule would place the "invasion of rights" at the
point of installation of the asbestos products. See supranotes 60-63 and accompanying text.
The date of injury rule would therefore act like the statute of limitations applicable to
warranty claims, that is, time-barring most, if not all asbestos property damage claims.
70 Schmidt 200 N.E. at 828.
71 Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 627 N.E.2d 1033, 1037
(Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
72 See Mehs, supra note 25, at 974 (citing Sheila Bimbaum, 'irst Breath's" Last Gasp:
The Discovery Rule in Products Liability Cases, 13 FORUM 279, 281 (1977)).
73 Id.
74 See Mehs, supra note 25, at 974 (noting that "'the injured party should be allowed to
have his day in court when his injury was of an inherently unknowable nature'") (citing
Sheila Birnbaum, "First Breath's" Last Gasp: The Discovey Rule in Products Liability Cases, 13
FORUM 279, 285 (1977)).
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within a single jurisdiction, that have applied the discovery rule in as-
bestos property damage actions have defined the injury several differ-
ent ways. Consequently, tort causes of action have accrued upon (1)
knowledge of "contamination" of the building by airborne asbestos,
(2) knowledge of the presence of friable asbestos, (3) knowledge of
the presence of asbestos, and (4) knowledge of the dangers of asbes-
tos in buildings.
a. Knowledge of "Contamination" Starts the Clock Ticking
Many courts have held that a tort cause of action in an asbestos
property damage case accrues upon the plaintiff's knowledge of "con-
tamination," which means that elevated levels of airborne asbestos fi-
bers have been detected in the building. In Heider v. W.R Grace &
Co.,75 the plaintiff was a private building owner who sued asbestos
manufacturers for abatement costs. The defendant argued that the
Illinois five-year statute of limitations barred the claim because the
plaintiff discovered the presence of asbestos in his building nine years
before filing his complaint.76 The court nevertheless allowed the
plaintiff' 7 to maintain the cause of action because the mere presence
of asbestos in buildings was not a sufficient basis for suing for property
damage.78 Since contamination to other parts of the building was re-
quired, the court concluded that the plaintiff did not possess actual or
constructive knowledge of his injury until he discovered
contamination. 79
In Heider, the court assumed that the plaintiff needed to discover
all of the elements of actionable property damage in order to discover
its injury. Thus, discovering the injury was equivalent to discovering
the existence of a legal cause of action against the asbestos defend-
ants. The requirement of contamination as an element of a tort cause
of action for asbestos property damage draws on the Heider court's
interpretation of the economic loss doctrine.8 0 The economic loss
doctrine states that a plaintiff may not sue in tort for pure economic
loss, and that the plaintiff must recover, if at all, under a contract the-
ory.8' A plaintiff may, however, recover for property damage.82 Heider
relied on decisions by a number of courts that have distinguished be-
75 No. 89 C 9067, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10239 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 1992).
76 Id. at *9-*12.
77 In Heider, a prior owner of the building actually discovered the presence of asbes-
tos; however, since the plaintiff was successor in interest, the viability of the plaintiff's cause
of action depended on whether the prior owner would have been time-barred. Id. at *16.
78 Id. at *12.
79 Id. at *12-*13.
80 See id. at*8-*16 (discussing cases construing the economic loss doctrine in deciding
when cause of action accrued).




tween economic loss and property damage in actions for the recovery
of asbestos abatement costs.83 These decisions have held that while
the presence of asbestos may cause the building owner to incur ex-
pense for removing it, it does not cause physical injury to other prop-
erty.84 Property damage occurs only when fibers release from the
asbestos-containing material, and asbestos dust "contaminates" other
areas of the building.85
Other courts that have used this knowledge-of-contamination
rule have employed similar reasoning.86 In MDU Resources Group v.
W.R. Grace & Co., the Eighth Circuit, in construing North Dakota law,
held that the statute of limitations began to run when the plaintiff
discovered asbestos contamination. 87 It began its analysis by stating
that "[ b] efore we can determine when the statute of limitations began
to run on MDU's claims, we must first determine when an asbestos
plaintiff is injured and can bring suit" 88 As in Heider, the court linked
the definition of "injury" for purposes of the discovery rule to the re-
quirements of a valid tort cause of action. The court found that under
the economic loss doctrine, a building owner must allege that the as-
bestos contaminated the building.89 Thus, the cause of action ac-
crued only when the plaintiff discovered contamination.
b. Knowledge of the Presence of Friable Asbestos Plus General
Awareness of the Dangers of Asbestos Starts the Clock
Ticking
Some courts have found that a plaintiff need not discover all the
elements of its cause of action before the limitations period begins to
run.90 In Detroit Board of Education v. Celotex Corp.,9' the Michigan
Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff school board discovered its
83 See Adams-Arapahoe Sch. Dist. No. 28-J v. United States Gypsum Co., 958 F.2d 381
(10th Cir. 1992); City of Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 827 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1987); 3250
Wilshire Blvd. Bldg. v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. CV 87-6048-WMB, 1989 U.S. Dist. Lexis
17287 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 1989); Catasqua Area Sch. Dist. v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., No.
85-3743, 1988 WL 102689 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 1988); City of Manchester v. National Gypsum
Co., 637 F. Supp. 646 (D.,.I. 1986); Hooksett Sch. Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 617 F. Supp.
126 (D.N.H. 1984); Board of Educ. of Chicago v. A, C & S, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 580 (Ill. 1989).
84 See id.
85 See City of Greenvi/e, 827 F.2d at 977-78.
86 Farm Credit Bank v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 864 F. Supp. 643 (W.D. Ky.
1994); City of Wichita v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F. Supp. 851 (D. Kan. 1993);
Landry v. Keene Corp., 811 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1993); City of San Diego v. United States
Gypsum, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 876 (Ct. App. 1994).
87 14 F.3d 1274 (8th Cir. 1994).
88 Id. at 1278.
89 Id. at 1278-79.
90 See, e.g., Appletree Square 1 Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 29 F.3d 1283, 1285 (8th Cir.
1994) (applying Minnesota law).
91 493 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
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injury once it "was in possession of a general knowledge of the hazards
of friable asbestos [and] also had actual knowledge that such materi-
als were in its buildings," and knew that the asbestos "would require
abatement." The court in Detroit Board of Education focused on the
plaintiff's knowledge of the presence of friable asbestos,92 rather than
on whether the plaintiff knew it had a legal claim.93 The court failed,
however, to provide an underlying rationale for its definition of "in-
jury," which made uncertain how it would resolve cases arising under
slightly different facts.
The court in California Sansome Co. v. United States Gypsum Co.94
came to a similar resolution of the statute of limitations issue, holding
on its facts that the cause of action accrued essentially when the plain-
tiffs learned of friable asbestos, but did not state a general rule for
when a cause of action accrues in asbestos property damage actions.
In California Sansome, the plaintiffs filed their action on April 24, 1989,
and under California's three-year statute of limitations, the plaintiffs'
action would have been time-barred had it discovered its injury prior
to April 24, 1986.95 The court analyzed the issue by recounting the
facts that the plaintiffs had learned by 1986. It noted that prior to
April, 1986, the plaintiffs knew that: (1) its buildings had fireproofing
material that contained asbestos; (2) the fireproofing was friable; (3)
"asbestos fireproofing was alleged to be a health hazard when it was
disturbed"; (4) institutional investors were "staying away from" build-
ings with asbestos; (5) the federal government would not lease space
in buildings containing asbestos; and (6) removal was expensive. 96
The court held that under California's "on inquiry" discovery rule, the
"plaintiffs suspected, and should have suspected, their injury and its
wrongful cause" prior to April, 1986.97 The court's construction of
the California discovery rule clearly required less knowledge of the
plaintiffs' asbestos problem for a cause of action to accrue than the
courts required in Heider or MDU Resources Group.98 Unfortunately,
92 Friable asbestos is asbestos that is capable of being crumbled in one's hands. It is
susceptible to deterioration and the release of asbestos fibers into the air, and according to
the EPA, "can cause contamination and exposure problems." EPA GUIDANCE DocuMENT,
supra note 31, at 2-3.
93 Detroit Bd. of Educ., 493 N.W.2d at 520.
94 819 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
95 Id. at 879-80.
96 Id. at 883-84.
97 Id. at 884. By its terms, the California discovery rule imposes a greater burden on
plaintiffs than many other jurisdictions' discovery rules. In California, "[a] plaintiff's
claims are deemed to have accrued for purposes of the running of the applicable statute of
limitations when the plaintiff suspected or should have suspected that it had been injured
and that the injury was the result of wrongdoing-or, in other words, when the plaintiff
had notice of information sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry." Id. at 881.
98 The California Court of Appeal in City of San Diego v. United States Gypsum, 35
Cal. Rptr. 2d 876 (Ct. App. 1994), held that under California law the cause of action ac-
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the California Sansome court did not intimate which facts were essential
to the outcome or state a rule that would help to resolve future cases.
c. Knowledge of the Presence of Asbestos and Awareness of Its
Dangers Starts the Clock Ticking
The Sixth Circuit in Roseville Plaza Limited Partnership v. United
States Gypsum Co.99 held as a matter of Michigan law that a cause of
action for asbestos property damage accrued upon discovery of the
simple presence of asbestos.100 It relied principally upon the Michi-
gan Court of Appeals' decision in Detroit Board of Education and found
that "knowledge of the presence of asbestos is enough to inform an
individual, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, of a 'possible
cause of action' for asbestos abatement or removal."' 0 This reason-
ing clearly diverges from the analysis behind the contamination rule.
In Roseville, the plaintiff needed only to learn of a "possible" cause of
action, but under the contamination rule, a plaintiff must learn of all
elements of an actual cause of action. The Sixth Circuit's reasoning,
however, did not address the apparent inconsistency between its hold-
ing and the outcome in Detroit Board of Education, since the two deci-
sions required different levels of knowledge for the cause of action to
accrue.' 0
2
A number of other courts deciding asbestos property damage
cases have also held that discovery of the presence of asbestos starts
the statute of limitations clock ticking.103 In Trizec Properties, Inc. v.
United States Mineral Products Co.,10 4 for example, the Fifth Circuit held
that the limitations period began to run from the point at which the
plaintiff had knowledge of the presence of asbestos, 10 5 but its reason-
ing was less than lucid. It stated that under Louisiana's discovery rule,
crued when asbestos-containing materials began to deteriorate, that is, when the materials
began to release asbestos fibers. Id. at 881.
99 31 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying Michigan law).
100 Id. at 400.
101 Id.
102 Id. (citing Detroit Bd. of Educ., 493 N.W.2d at 520, and then announcing holding
"[a]fter careful review of the record and the law of Michigan").
103 See Hebron Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 13 v. United States Gypsum, 953 F.2d 398, 401-02
(8th Cir. 1992) (applying North Dakota law); NCR Corp. v. United States Mineral Prods.
Co., No. 91-3339, slip op. at 6 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 1, 1993); see also Cameron Parish Sch.
Dist. Bd. v. Acands, Inc. No. 94-545, 1994 WL 597618 (La. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 1994); Colum-
bus Bd. of Educ. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 627 N.E.2d 1033 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993);
Beavercreek Local Sch. v. Basic, Inc., 595 N.E.2d 360 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991). In these last
three cases, the courts held that knowledge of the presence of asbestos, knowledge of the
dangers of asbestos, and the fact that the plaintiff took steps to abate asbestos caused the
limitations period to begin to run. In Part III, this Note proposes a rule that would com-
port with these decisions.
104 974 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1992).
105 Id. at 607.
[Vol. 80:695
NOTE-ASBESTOS PROPERTY
"the prescriptive period on a cause of action begins to run when the
person in whose favor a cause of action exists knows or should have
known of the existence of his cause of action."'0 6 The court con-
cluded that the plaintiff's claim was time-barred based upon the point
at which the plaintiff had acquired knowledge of the presence of as-
bestos.'0 7 It did not, however, explain how knowledge of the presence
of asbestos related to knowledge of the "existence of [a] cause of
action."' 08
d. Cause of Action Accrues upon Awareness of Dangers of Asbestos
in Buildings
The Michigan Court of Appeals in Warren Consolidated Schools v.
WR Grace & Co.' 09 allowed a tort cause of action to accrue before the
plaintiff had any specific knowledge about an asbestos problem in its
buildings. In Warren, the school district filed its complaint against as-
bestos manufacturers on April 4, 1986.110 Under the discovery rule
and Michigan's three-year statute of limitations, the school district's
claim would have been time-barred if it should have discovered its in-
jury before April 4, 1983. The court, however, held that the cause of
action accrued before that date and dismissed the plaintiff's claim.
Although the plaintiff claimed that it was not aware of even the pres-
ence of asbestos on April 4, 1983, the court stated that the plaintiff
knew of the risks of airborne asbestos by 1977."'1 The court found it
significant that the Michigan Department of Public Health had
"warned" the school district to inspect its buildings for friable asbes-
tos, and that federal statutes and regulations in the late 1970s had
informed building owners of the risks of asbestos. 1
2
The Warren case is notable because the court based its decision
on plaintiff's awareness of the dangers of asbestos in general, and not
on its awareness of any facts concerning specific buildings and the
asbestos products in them. Warren, therefore, is an unprecedented
interpretation of the discovery rule. This case also illustrates the diffi-
culty in applying the discovery rule in asbestos property damage ac-
tions. The Michigan Court of Appeals, which decided both Warren
and Detroit Board of Education v. Celotex Corp.,"1 3 found in the latter case




109 518 N.W.2d 508 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
110 Id. at 509.
111 Id. at 510.
112 Id.
113 493 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. CL App. 1992).
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the presence of friable asbestos in its buildings. 1" 4 Warren cites Detroit
Board of Education as authority for its holding, but does not address
this apparent inconsistency.
1 5
The previous discussion demonstrates that courts have failed to
achieve a consistent application of the discovery rule. This has proven
true even for cases within the same jurisdiction. Moreover, few if any
decisions have provided reasoned elaboration for their holdings. In
some cases, courts simply give conclusory statements of the outcome
without ever clearly indicating what level of knowledge is necessary, as
a general matter, for a cause of action to accrue. This state of affairs
provides little guidance to either building owners seeking to preserve
their rights or to courts charged with deciding future cases. What is
missing is a principled basis for thinking about when a cause of action
should accrue.
The "contamination" rule, which a number of courts have
adopted, is the clearest conceptual approach. The reasoning behind
this rule is that the clock does not start ticking until the plaintiff knew
or should have known that he or she had a cognizable tort claim for
property damage. It is also intuitively appealing to equate the "injury"
for statute of limitations purposes with the "injury" for which the
plaintiff will claim a right to compensation in the case on the merits.
Moreover, courts are likely to feel most comfortable with the contami-
nation rule because it draws on a well-developed body of case law that
defines the required elements of an asbestos property damage action.
The discovery rule surely requires, as any accrual rule must, the
existence of facts that would allow the plaintiff to state a claim. Other-
wise, as noted in Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transportation Co., the
limitations period could begin to run before the necessary facts exis-
ted, and the plaintiff's claim "might be barred before liability
arose."116 However, fairness to the plaintiff would not necessarily re-
quire knowledge of each element of a cause of action. Indeed, most
courts specifically state that the plaintiff need not know the extent of
its damages for the clock to start ticking. Instead, fairness only re-
quires knowledge (actual or constructive) of a "problem" with the
product, which, if investigated, would reveal the facts necessary to
plead a valid claim. The discovery rule, by its own terms, demands
only actual or constructive knowledge of an "injury."117 This elastic
114 Id. at 520.
115 518 N.W.2d at 510-11.
116 200 N.E. 824, 827 (N.Y. 1936).
117 Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 627 N.E.2d 1033, 1037
(Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
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term, coupled with the policies behind statutes of limitations,118
would suggest that the ability to plead a valid claim is not an indispen-
sable part of a discovery rule.
Unfortunately, once courts have eschewed the contamination
rule, they have found themselves at sea in deciding what exactly the
building owner should know before a cause of action accrues. A
number of decisions have set knowledge of the presence of asbestos or
knowledge of the presence of friable asbestos as the requirement for
accrual of the cause of action. These cases, however, have failed to
really explain why a certain level of knowledge, and no other, should
start the clock ticking. Embedded in these decisions, however, is the
concept of reasonable notice. In Detroit Board of Education, for exam-
ple, the court stated that " [p]erfect knowledge of the extent of an
injury" is not required for the limitations period to begin to run.119
The devil has been in determining how much knowledge is
required. 20
3. Missouri's Particularized Common Law Rule for Asbestos Proerty
Damage Actions
Missouri courts, after repeatedly confronting the statute of limita-
tions issue, have refined their general discovery rule to formulate a
rule that determines when a tort cause of action accrues in an asbestos
property damage case. The Missouri rule states that a cause of action
in tort accrues when there is a "release of toxic asbestos fibers into the
environment... together with the ability to ascertain a substantial and
unreasonable risk of harm from the release of the toxic asbestos fi-
bers. '1" 2 In both Kansas City v. W.R Grace & Co. (Kansas City 1) 12 2 and
Clayton Center Associates v. W.R Grace & Co.,' 23 the plaintiffs, suing for
property damage caused by asbestos in buildings survived the statute
of limitations challenge under this generous (for plaintiffs) rule.
In Missouri, defendants must show both actual contamination of
the building by asbestos fibers and knowledge of a health hazard.124
Far beyond mere presence of asbestos or even presence of friable as-
bestos, "contamination" under the Missouri rule means that signifi-
118 The main concern behind the discovery rule is assuring fairness to plaintiffs. How-
ever, meaningful notice does not require perfect knowledge or even knowledge sufficient
to successfully litigate a claim.
119 493 N.W.2d at 520; ef Warren Consol. Sch. v. Basic, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 508, 510
(Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (plaintiff must discover only a "possible cause of action").
120 In Part III this Note attempts to pinpoint what reasonable notice should mean in
an asbestos property damage action.
121 Kansas City I, 778 S.W.2d 264, 268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (citing School Dist. of Inde-
pendence v. United States Gypsum Co., 750 S.W.2d 442, 457 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)).
122 778 S.W.2d 264 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
123 861 S.W.2d 686 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
124 See Clayton, 861 S.W.2d at 690 (citing Kansas City I, 778 S.W.2d at 268).
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cant levels of asbestos fibers have been released into the building's
airspace. 125 In Clayton, the court found no contamination even
though a report showed measurable, though low, levels of asbestos
fibers in the environment. 126 The high threshold for establishing
"contamination" makes it difficult to prevail on a statute of limitations
defense in this jurisdiction.
The other element of a successful statute of limitations defense in
Missouri is establishing the plaintiff's knowledge of an unreasonable
health risk. 127 This is a heavy burden for defendants. In Kansas City I,
the plaintiff city learned, well before the critical statute of limitations
date, of problems with the asbestos-containing building materials in
the municipal airport. 128 Asbestos-laden materials had been breaking
apart and falling down into work areas of the airport. 129 In addition,
the city knew of the general dangers of asbestos exposure. 30 Despite
these facts, the Kansas City Icourt held that the city did not possess the
requisite knowledge of a substantial health risk and denied the de-
fendants' motion for summary judgment.'3 ' Kansas City I demon-
strates that defendants in asbestos property damage cases will have
difficulty asserting a statute of limitations defense under the Missouri
discovery rule because courts will require a substantial showing of
plaintiff's knowledge of an asbestos problem in order for the cause of
action to accrue.
C. Accrual of the Breach of Warranty Cause of.Action
Plaintiff building owners often allege that defendants have
breached an express or implied warranty by supplying a potentially
hazardous product that can only be removed at great cost.
l 2
125 See id.
126 Id. The court in Clayton noted that the fiber levels were well below the then EPA
standard of 2.0 fibers/cc. Id. While this is true, it is extraordinary that the court estab-
lished the maximum level of occupational exposure as the standard for "contamination."
Certainly, the reasonable risk to building occupants is lower than that for occupationally
exposed workers. "Contamination," for statute of limitations purposes, should probably be
defined as any known release of asbestos fibers into the environment.
127 Kansas City I, 778 S.W.2d at 268.
128 Id. at 269.
129 Id.
180 Id. at 270.
11 Id. at 271.
132 See, e.g., Appletree Square 1 Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 815 F. Supp. 1266, 1280 (D.
Minn. 1993) (plaintiff alleged that defendant breached express warranties, as well as im-




1. Asbestos Property Damage and Warranty Claims: Difficulties on
the Merits
An express warranty claim may fail on the merits if plaintiffs are
unable to make a prima facie showing of the defendants' affirmative
representations of the product's qualities.13 3 Indeed, some plaintiffs
have not succeeded on an express warranty theory because they were
unable to allege any explicit affirmations that defendants made about
their products.13 4 On the other hand, a cause of action for a breach
of the implied warranty of merchantability requires no such explicit
promise. 3 5 Implied warranty causes of action, however, have some-
times proven to be unsuccessful because the plaintiff is not in privity
with the defendant' 36 The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) gen-
erally requires that a plaintiff be in privity with the defendant to state
a claim for branch of an implied warranty. 137 Although privity is not
always required when a plaintiff alleges personal injury, it is required
when property damage is at issue.138 Thus, a plaintiff who retains no
contract rights against the asbestos manufacturer or seller will likely
be barred from recovery under any warranty theory.
2. The Statute of Limitations Forecloses Most Warranty Causes of
Action
Apart from the substantive problems with warranty causes of ac-
tion, one must also recognize the presumptive effect of the statute of
limitations. Warranty claims in asbestos property damage suits are-
almost without exception-time-barred, mooting the substantive is-
sues just discussed.' 3 9 As a practical matter, a plaintiff without knowl-
133 See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Chicago v. A, C & S, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 580, 598 (fI1. 1989)
(concluding that allegations were too vague to support an express warranty claim).
134 See id.
135 U.C.C. § 2-314 (1977) (implied warranty of merchantability is an obligation im-
plied by law, and does not depend on the terms of the parties' contract for its enforcement
in court).
136 See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Chicago, 546 N.E.2d at 596 ("plaintiffs only state a cause of
action against the defendants with whom they can establish privity of contract").
137 See id. at 595 (citing 3 R. ANDERSON, UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314.92
through 2-314:98 (1983)).
138 See id. at 596 (citingJAMmsJ. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 11-4, at 535 (3d ed. 1988)).
139 See, e.g., Farm Credit Bank v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 864 F. Supp. 643,
646-47 (W.D. Ky. 1994); Appletree Square 1 Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 815 F. Supp. 1266,
1281 (D. Minn. 1993), affd, 29 F.3d 1283 (8th Cir. 1994); Mayv. A C & S, Inc., 812 F. Supp.
934, 944 (E.D. Mo. 1993); In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., No. 83.0268, 1990 WL 199065, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 1990); Altoona Area Vocational Tech. Sch. v. United States Mineral
Prods. Co., No. 86-2498, 1988 WL 236355, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 1988); Crotched Moun-
tain Rehabilitation Ctr., Inc. v. National Gypsum Co., No. C85-488-L, slip op. (D.N.H. Dec.
25, 1985).
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edge of the alleged breach of warranty will be hard-pressed to file her
lawsuit on time. 40
Statute of Limitations for Warranty Claim
(Appletree Square Ltd. 1 Partnership v. W.R Grace & Co.14 1)
4 yr SOLI- -I
1974 1978 1986 1990
Tender of Warranty Plaintiff Plaintiff files
delivery Claim is discovers suit for asbestos
of asbestos time-barred presence property damage
product of asbestos
When attempting to recover under U.C.C. warranty theory, plain-
tiffs must contend with a four-year statute of limitations.142 More im-
portantly, breach of warranty claims accrue at the time of "tender of
delivery" of the goods.1 43 Knowledge of the breach is specifically
omitted as a requirement for the limitations period to begin run-
ning.'44 Consequently, a plaintiff cannot recover under U.C.C. war-
ranty causes of action unless the defect in the goods can be discovered
within four years of delivery. The apparent unfairness of this rule4 5
can only be explained by the underlying policies of the U.C.C.,
namely, to encourage the efficient sale of goods. 46 Essentially, the
140 See, e.g., Appletree, 815 F. Supp. at 1280-81. The buildings at issue were completed in
1973-74, and the plaintiff claimed that it did not learn of even the presence of asbestos
until 1986. Id. at 1276-77. The court held that the warranty claim was time-barred because
the cause of action accrued at the time of the tender of delivery, meaning that the four-
year limitations period began to run in 1973 or 1974. Id. at 1280-81.
141 815 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Minn. 1993), aff'd, 29 F.3d 1283 (8th Cir. 1994).
142 U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1977).
143 Id. § 2-725(2) (excepting warranties explicitly extending to future performance).
144 SeeJAmEsJ. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UMNFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-9 (3d
ed. 1988) ("The statute normally commences to run upon tender of delivery, and the clock
ticks even though the buyer does not know the goods are defectiv").
145 A plaintiffs claims under warranty theory can be time-barred even though most of
the buildings at issue in asbestos property damage litigation were constructed 20 to 40
years ago. Until the early 1970s asbestos products were perceived as very useful or even
essential in the construction of buildings. During this time period, the health risks of
exposure to airborne asbestos were not widely appreciated. See supra notes 24-32 and ac-
companying text. The practical effect of the statute of limitations under the U.C.C. is to
time-bar claims well before a building owner could discover the alleged breach, and hence,
well before she could ever file a complaint.
146 As the court in Crotched Mountain Rehabilitation Ctr., Inc. v. National Gypsum
Co., No. C85-488-L, slip op. (D.N.H. Dec. 27, 1985) observed: "A final and less important
policy behind the notice requirement is to give the defendant that same kind of mind balm
he gets from the statute of limitations. There is some value in allowing a seller, at some
point, to close his books on goods sold in the past and to pass on to other things." Id. at 3
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U.C.C. statute of limitations operates to provide maximum certainty
for the parties by fixing the time of the transaction as the beginning of
the limitations period. 147
D. The Restitution Cause of Action: Solving the Time-Bar
Problem, But Wrong on the Merits
Plaintiffs have consistently pleaded restitution claims in asbestos
property damage actions. Essentially, restitution is an equitable prin-
ciple that requires the "making good or giving equivalent for any loss,
damage or injury" when it would be unjust not to do so.
14
1. Restitution Cause of Action Avoids the Statute of Limitations
Plaintiff building owners have relied on section 115 of the Re-
statement of Restitution for the proposition that one who has per-
formed "the duty of another by supplying things or services is entitled
to restitution" if the supplying of the goods or services was done unof-
ficiously and "[was] immediately necessary to satisfy the requirements
of public decency, health or safety."1 49 Liability under restitution re-
quires the payment of money to correct a wrong, and it is this pay-
ment that a plaintiff seeks to recover.' 50 Plaintiffs have therefore
argued that a restitution claim does not accrue until the building
owner spends money to abate the asbestos, since the owner sustains
no injury until he or she has incurred expense. 151 Restitution theory
thus enables plaintiffs to circumvent normal accrual rules or to avoid
the consequences of their own delay.
(quotingJAMEsJ. WHrrE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-9, at 344
(2d ed. 1972); see also Cinnaminson Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 552 F. Supp.
855, 860-61 (D.NJ. 1982) (citing the "concern of finality underlying the statute of limita-
tions of the U.C.C.").
147 Note how the accrual of a warranty cause of action resembles the operation of a
statute of repose. See discussion infra part ll.B. In both situations, a clearly-defined point
triggers the start of the limitations period, and the plaintiff's lack of knowledge of the
existence of his or her claim is irrelevant.
148 BLAcK's LAW DICrIONARY 1313 (6th ed. 1990).
149 RESTATEMENT (FiRsr) OF REnTTiON § 115 (1937).
150 See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Chicago v. A, C & S, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 580, 596-97 (Ill.
1989). Almost every asbestos property damage action is one to recover money already
spent for clean-up costs.
151 See 888 7th Ave. Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. AAER Sprayed Insulations, Inc., No.
11579/91, slip. op. at 15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 24, 1992) (rejecting argument that the "statute
of limitations would not begin to run on the indemnity and restitution claims until the
owner of [the] property decided to spend money to remedy that hazard"), affd, 605
N.Y.S.2d 25 (App. Div. 1993); cf. Security Homestead Ass'n v. W.R. Grace & Co., 743 F.
Supp. 456, 461 (E.D. La. 1990) (rejecting restitution theory, noting that "[p]laintiff had
numerous possible remedies when it first discovered that its fireproofing material con-
tained asbestos, but failed to act upon them within the one-year prescriptive period pro-
vided by law").
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Restitution Claim: Creative Pleading to Avoid the Statute of Limita-
tions (888 7th Avenue Associates Limited Partnership v. AAER Sprayed Insu-
lations, InC.'52)
3 yr SOL Plaintiff argues
for tort that Restitution
claims claim accrues
--I--------------in 1988 ---
1946 1973 5/87 1988 5/90 10190
Widespread use Plaintiff Plaintiff Plaintiff
of Asbestos in discovers begins to files suit
Buildings it must spend money for asbestos
1946-1973 abate to abate property
asbestos asbestos damage
2. Restitution Should Not be Available for Property Damage Caused
by a Defective Product
Although courts have accepted section 115 of the Restatement of
Restitution as controlling authority,153 each element of this cause of
action is suspect in the property damage context. Some courts have
ruled that a building owner's efforts to abate asbestos from his or her
own building are "officious."1 54 Furthermore, defendants have ar-
gued that asbestos abatement is not "immediately necessary" to pro-
tect the public health.155
The most significant obstacle for plaintiffs has been establishing
the underlying duty owed by the asbestos manufacturer or sellers.
Plaintiffs argue that the defendants have a duty to abate, and that
their failure to do so creates a claim for restitution. 5 6 Under tradi-
tional restitution theory, the defendant owes an underlying duty to a
152 No. 11579/91, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 24, 1992), affd, 605 N.Y.S.2d 25 (App.
Div. 1993).
153 See, e.g., Hebron Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 13 v. United States Gypsum, 690 F. Supp. 866,
869 (D.N.D. 1988); Board of Educ. of Chicago v. A, C & S, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 580, 597 (Ill.
1989).
154 See, e.g., Roseville Plaza Ltd. Partnership v. United States Gypsum Co., 811 F. Supp.
1200, 1212-13 (E.D. Mich. 1992), affd, 31 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 1994); Hooksett Sch. Dist. v.
W.R. Grace & Co., 617 F. Supp. 126, 134 (D.N.H. 1984) (plaintiff acting as "volunteer"
when it removed asbestos).
155 See Hebron Pub. Sch. Dist., 690 F. Supp. at 869. The court rejected the defendant's
argument that abatement was not "immediately necessary." Although it did concede that
asbestos is "slow-acting," the fact that few, if any building occupants have become sick when
most asbestos in buildings has been in place for decades, lends credence to the defen-
dant's argument. Another court may well accept this line of reasoning.
156 See, e.g., Roseville Plaza, 811 F. Supp. at 1210.
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third person rather than to the plaintiff himself.157 The language of
section 115 seems broad enough, however, to encompass duties owed
by an asbestos manufacturer to a plaintiff building owner.' 58 None-
theless, courts have had difficulty finding an independent legal duty
owed by defendants to abate asbestos. 159 A few courts have decided
that other causes of action may establish that duty and have upheld the
validity of restitution on motions to dismiss.
160
This approach has the perverse effect of allowing a restitution
claim only if the plaintiff can prevail under other causes of action (i.e.,
negligence, strict liability, or breach of warranty). 161 One problem
with this approach is that a restitution claim would be created with
every products liability case. 162 More importantly, it would allow
plaintiffs to extend, indefinitely, the time in which they may bring
suit-a result inimical to the purpose of a statute of limitations.163 In
sum, courts have generally rejected restitution claims in asbestos prop-
erty damage actions,'6 but if accepted, this theory may allow plaintiffs
to subvert the statute of limitations altogether.
157 See Board of Educ. of Chicago, 546 N.E.2d at 597 (citing cases in which restitution was
a valid cause of action, all involved performance of a duty that benefitted the public at
large).
158 Cf Hebron Pub. Sch. Dist., 690 F. Supp. at 869 (noting that § 115's duty element is a
"flexible concept"); City of N.Y. v. Keene Corp., 505 N.Y.S.2d 782, 787 (Sup. Ct. 1986)
(upholding restitution cause of action), aff'd 513 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (App. Div. 1987); see also
City of Phila. v. Lead Indus. Ass'n., No. 90-7064, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5849 at *25 (E.D.
Pa. 1992) ("Section 115 of the Restatement certainly does not require by its terms or under
the case law interpreting it, that a duty must be absolute to fall within it parameters.") (lead
paint case).
159 See, e.g., Heider v. W.R. Grace & Co.-CONN., No. 89 C 9067, 1990 WL 129347 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 24, 1990); Altoona Area Vocational Tech. Sch. v. United States Mineral Prods. Co.,
No. 86-2498, 1988 WL 236355 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 1988); Board of Educ. of Chicago v. A, C
& S, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 580, 598 (Ill. 1989).
160 See Hebron Pub. Sch. Dist, 690 F. Supp. at 869.; City of N.Y., 505 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
161 Besides, if the plaintiff can establish another viable cause of action, a restitution
claim would seem redundant.
162 See Board of Educ. of Chicago, 546 N.E.2d at 598.
163 888 7th Ave. Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. AAER Sprayed Insulations, Inc., No. 11579/
91, slip op. at 15-16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 24, 1992) ("To permit these indemnity and restitu-
tion claims, when the underlying claims upon which the breaches of duty are premised
were time-barred, would undermine the purposes of the statute of limitations."), affd, 605
N.Y.S.2d 25 (App. Div. 1993).
164 S e, e.g., Farm Credit Bank v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 864 F. Supp. 643,
647-48 (W.D, Ky. 1994); Roseville Plaza Ltd. Partnership v. United States Gypsum Co., 811
F. Supp. 1200, 1212-13 (E.D. Mich. 1992), aft'd, 31 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 1994); Heider v. W.R.
Grace & Co.-CONN., No. 89 C 9067, 1990 WL 129347 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 1990); Security
Homestead Ass'n v. W.R. Grace & Co., 743 F. Supp. 456, 462 (E.D. La. 1990); Altoona Area
Vocational Tech. Sch. v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., No. 86-2498, 1988 WL 236355
(W.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 1988); Hooksett Sch. Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 617 F. Supp. 126, 134
(D.N.H. 1984); Board of Educ. of Chicago, 546 N.E.2d at 598. Contra Drayton Pub. Sch. Dist.
No. 19 v. W.R. Grace & Co., 728 F. Supp. 1410, 1414-15 (D.N.D. 1989); Hebron Pub. Sch.
Dist., 690 F. Supp. at 869; Adams-Arapahoe Sch. Dist. No. 28-J v. Celotex Corp., 637 F.
19951
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
E. Nuisance: Solving the Time-Bar Problem, But Again, Wrong
on the Merits
Plaintiffs have also attempted to use nuisance theory to avoid the
statute of limitations. In asbestos property damage actions plaintiffs
have argued that the presence of asbestos products in buildings is a
nuisance for which the manufacturers, sellers, and installers are lia-
ble. 165 For example, in Tioga Public SchoolDistrict No. 15 v. United States
Gypsum Co.,166 the school district argued that asbestos in buildings is a
nuisance because it (1) "[a]nnoys, injures, or endangers the comfort,
repose, health, or safety of others" and (2) "renders other persons
insecure in ... the use of property." 67 Under this theory, the pres-
ence of asbestos products is a continuing nuisance until they are re-
moved. Therefore, a cause of action for nuisance would not be
barred by the statute of limitations since the defendants' breach of
duty is ongoing.168
The defects of this theory are manifest. First, a nuisance is, in
broad terms, "a wrongful use of property.' 69 The selling of a product
is incongruous with that concept. Second, the defendant must gener-
ally be in control of the alleged nuisance. 170 Asbestos manufacturers
and sellers have no control over products once they have been sold
and have no "legal right to abate whatever hazard its product may
have posed."'171 Finally, plaintiffs could cast every products liability ac-
Supp. 1207, 1209 (D. Colo. 1986); City of N.Y. v. Keene Corp., 505 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. Ct.
1986), affd, 513 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (App. Div. 1987).
165 See, e.g., Detroit Bd. of Educ. v. Celotex Corp., 493 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. Ct. App.
1992).
166 984 F.2d 915 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying North Dakota law).
167 Id. at 920 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-01-01 (Michie Supp. 1993)).
168 See Detroit Bd. of Educ., 493 N.W.2d at 521 (noting that plaintiff's "nuisance claim
survived in the trial court.., on the basis that the asbestos products were a continuing
nuisance" and therefore not barred by the statute of limitations); see also Lawrence Teplin
et al., A Practical Legal Approach to Asbestos in Buildings, in ASBESTOS ABATEMENT UPDATE 50
(George A. Peters & BarbaraJ. Peters eds., 1990) (advising that building owner may argue
that the presence of asbestos constitutes a "continuing tort" that tolls the statute of limita-
tions) (citing Huntsville City Bd. of Educ. v. National Gypsum Co., No. CV 83-325L (Ala.
Cir. Ct. Aug. 28, 1984)).
169 Detroit Bd. of Educ., 493 N.W.2d at 521 (distinguishing between wrongful use of
property and "improper condition of property"). The court in Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist., in
dismissing plaintiff's nuisance claim, stated that "North Dakota cases applying the state's
nuisance statute all appear to arise in the classic context of a landowner or other person in
control of property conducting an activity on his land in such a manner as to interfere with
the property rights of a neighbor." 984 F.2d at 920.
170 See Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist., 984 F.2d at 920 (noting that liability for nuisance usually
turns on whether defendant "is in control of the instrumentality"); City of Manchester v.
National Gypsum Co., 637 F. Supp. 646, 656 (D.R.I. 1986) ("If the defendants exercised no
control over the instrumentality, then a remedy directed against them is of little use.")
(applying New Hampshire law).
'71 Roseville Plaza Ltd. v. United States Gypsum Co., 811 F. Supp. 1200, 1210 (E.D.
Mich. 1992), aftd, 31 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 1994).
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tion as a nuisance claim, 72 thereby postponing the filing of their com-
plaints and subverting the public policies underlying statutes of
limitations. For these reasons, courts have almost unanimously re-
jected nuisance claims in asbestos property damage cases. 173
F. Allegations of Fraud: Tolling the Statute of Limitations
Plaintiff building owners, in drafting their complaints, commonly
allege some form of fraud.' 7 4 These claims are difficult to prove and
are generally unsupported by the facts. 175 However, fraudulent behav-
172 See id. ("[T]he public would not be served by neutralizing the limitation period by
labeling a products liability claim one for nuisance."); County ofJohnson v. United States
Gypsum Co., 580 F. Supp. 284, 290 (E.D. Tenn. 1984).
173 See Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist., 984 F.2d at 920 (noting that all courts that "have consid-
ered the issue have rejected nuisance... theory" in asbestos property damage cases);
Roseville Plaza Ltd. v. United States Gypsum Co., 811 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Mich. 1992),
affd, 31 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 1994); City of Manchester v. National Gypsum Co., 637 F. Supp.
646 (D.RI. 1986); Corporation of Mercer Univ. v. National Gypsum Co., 24 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1953 (M.D. Ga. 1986); County of Johnson v. United States Gypsum Co., 584 F.
Supp. 284 (E.D. Tenn. 1984); Hooksett Sch. Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 617 F. Supp. 126
(D.N.H. 1984); City of San Diego v. United States Gypsum, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 876 (Ct. App.
1994); Warren Consol. Sch. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 518 N.W.2d 508 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994);
Detroit Bd. of Educ. v. Celotex Corp., 493 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992). But see
Hebron Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 13 v. United States Gypsum, 690 F. Supp. 866, 872 (D.N.D.
1988) (denying motion to dismiss nuisance count; finding that North Dakota law does not
require "that the nuisance be under the control of the defendant").
174 See, e.g., Metropolitan Fed. Bank v. W.R. Grace & Co., 999 F.2d 1257, 1261 (8th Cir.
1993) (applying Minnesota law); In reAsbestos Sch. Litig., No. 83-0268, 1990 WL 73000, at
*1 (E.D. Pa. May 25, 1990); Crotched Mountain Rehabilitation Ctr., Inc. v. National Gyp-
sum Co., No. C85-488-L (D.N.H. Dec. 27, 1985); Board of Educ. of Chicago v. A, C & S,
Inc., 546 N.E.2d 580, 594 (Ill. 1989); Kansas City I, 778 S.W.2d 264, 273 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989).
175 See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Chicago v. A, C & S, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 580, 594 (Ill. 1989).
The court dismissed plaintiff's fraudulent misrepresentation claim on the ground that it
was not pled with sufficient "specificity, certainty and particularity." Id. The court ex-
pressed incredulity at plaintiffs assertion that "78 named defendants and 26 unnamed
ones" participated in a joint effort to suppress the dissemination of information about
asbestos products from the early 1900s. Id. This vague conspiracy comprising a "nebulous
group of defendants" in different industries, doing business at different times, simply
could not support a fraud claim. Id.
The difficulty in even pleading fraud underscores the problems encountered in actu-
ally proving it. Many courts have dismissed fraud claims either because they were inade-
quately pled, or because the claims were unsupported by the evidence in the record. See,
e.g., Metropolitan Fed. Bank, 999 F.2d at 1261 (no fraud because defendants made no affirm-
ative representations to plaintiff); Appletree Square 1 Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 815 F.
Supp. 1266, 1275 (D. Minn. 1993) (no issue of material fact as to fraudulent concealment;
defendants' motion for summaryjudgrnent granted), af'd, 29 F.3d 1283 (8th Cir. 1994);
Landry v. Keene Corp., 811 F. Supp. 367, 372-73 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (plaintiffs did not plead
any affirmative acts or representations to establish fraudulent concealment to toll statute of
repose); In reAsbestos Sch. Litig., No. 83-0268, 1991 WL 3890, at *2 (E.D. Pa.Jan. 9, 1991)
(defendant's motion for summary judgment granted because no evidence "suggests an
affirmative act of fraud by the defendants"); In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., No. 83-0268, 1990
WL 73000 (E.D. Pa. May 25, 1990) (no facts to support plaintiffs' claims of fraudulent
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ior that prevents a plaintiff from discovering his or her injury will toll
the statute of limitations or, if applicable, the statute of repose.176
With respect to statutes of limitations, fraud by the defendant will
toll the statute until the time when the plaintiff should have discov-
ered the fraud. 177 For a warranty claim, U.C.C. section 2-725(4) ex-
pressly permits equitable tolling doctrines to postpone the accrual of
the cause of action even though U.C.C. section 2-725(2) states that the
cause of action accrues at the time of tender of delivery. 178 This provi-
sion may allow a plaintiff to benefit from a quasi-discovery rule. 179 For
tort claims, the allegation of fraud means that the cause of action ac-
crues upon discovery of the fraud rather than the underlying
injury.180
Fraud also tolls statutes of repose until discovery of the defective
condition of the structure. 18' Again, the plaintiff benefits from a dis-
covery rule rather than facing the usual statute of repose, which extin-
guishes the right to sue a specified number of years following
construction of the building. 8 2 Allegations of fraud, by their nature,
tend to raise factual issues, making a claim of fraudulent concealment
or civil conspiracy a potentially effective means of avoiding dismissal
on statute of limitations grounds.
183
concealment). But see Rowan County Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 418 S.E.2d
648 (N.C. 1992) (upholding finding of fraud in action against asbestos manufacturer).
176 See, e.g., Metropolitan Fed. Bank, 793 F. Supp. at 208 (fraud tolls statute of repose); In
reAsbestos Sch. Litig., No. 8-0268, 1991 WL 175848, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1991) (allega.
tions of fraud "delay the commencement of the applicable limitations period" for statute of
limitations).
177 See In reAsbestos Sch. Litig., No. 83-0268, 1991 WL 175848, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4,
1991) (limitations period does not begin to run "until the plaintiff knew, or exercising
reasonable diligence should have known of the alleged fraud").
178 See WHrTE & SUMMERS, supra note 144, at § 11-9 (citing U.C.C. § 2-725).
179 See City of Manchester v. National Gypsum Co., 637 F. Supp. 646, 653 (D.R.I. 1986)
(fraudulent concealment tolls statute of limitations for breach of warranty claim);
Crotched Mountain Rehabilitation Ctr., Inc. v. National Gypsum Co., No. C85-488-L, slip
op. (D.N.H. Dec. 27, 1985) (same).
180 See Kansas City I, 778 S.W.2d 264, 273 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (affirmative acts to con-
ceal fraud will toll the statute until the fraud is discovered); In reAsbestos Sch. Litig., No.
83-0268, 1991 WL 175848, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1991) (statute tolled "until the plaintiff
knew, or in exercising reasonable diligence should have known of the alleged fraud").
181 See, e.g., Appletree Square 1 Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 815 F. Supp. 1266, 1274 (D.
Minn. 1993) (fraudulent actions preventing plaintiff from discovering defective condition
toll statute of repose), aff'd, 29 F.3d 1283 (8th Cir. 1994).
182 See id.
183 See, e.g., In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., No. 83-0268, 1991 WL 175848, at *7 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 4, 1991) (genuine issue of fact as to plaintiff' knowledge of defendants' alleged
conspiratorial or concerted behavior); Independent Sch. Dist. No. 197 v. W.R. Grace &
Co., 752 F. Supp. 286, 290 (D. Minn. 1990) (allegation of fraudulent concealment avoids
the statute of repose because the defendant was unable to show that plaintiff had, in fact,
discovered its injury within 10 years of the completion of the building); Corporation of
Mercer Univ. v. National Gypsum Co., 24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1953 (M.D. Ga. 1986)




THE ROLE OF STATE LEGISLATION AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. Special Asbestos Legislation
In response to the magnitude of the asbestos personal injury liti-
gation and the particular statute of limitations problems inherent in
latent injury cases, many state legislatures have enacted statutes that
govern the limitations period for asbestos personal injury suits.' 8
4
Some legislatures have also created special statutes of limitations for
asbestos property damage actions.'8 5 These statutes take three forms:
(1) legislation that creates a special limitations period for asbestos
property damage actions, 86 (2) legislation that "revives" claims other-
wise time-barred, 8 7 and (3) legislation that specifies what facts are
necessary for a cause of action to accrue.'88
1. Statutes that Expand the Limitations Period
The Massachusetts statute exemplifies the first type of statute; it
doubles the normal statute of limitations of three years to six years for
asbestos property damage actions.' 89 By lengthening the limitations
period for this class of actions, the Massachusetts legislature clearly
expressed leniency for public bodies seeking to recover asbestos abate-
ment costs, and the statute has posed few interpretative problems.' 90
Connecticut likewise gives asbestos cases special treatment, but takes a
somewhat different approach.' 9 ' Its statute subjects all products liabil-
ity claims, including asbestos property damage suits, to the normal
three-year limitations period.' 92 However, the plaintiffs may not gen-
erally bring products liability claims more than ten years after the de-
fendant parted with "possession or control of the product."' 93 The
Manchester, 637 F. Supp. at 653-55 (fraud claims upheld on motion to dismiss); Hooksett
Sch. Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 617 F. Supp. 126 (D.N.H. 1984) (plaintiff stated claim for
fraudulent concealment); Kansas City I, 778 S.W.2d at 273 (allegations of defendant's
fraudulent misrepresentation of the safety of their products raised a factual issue).
184 See, e.g., AlA. CODE § 6-2-30(b) (1993) (discovery rule for asbestos personal injury
suits). See generaly Mehs, supra note 25.
185 Most of the special legislation described in this section applies only to suits where
the plaintiff is a governmental, educational, or charitable entity. Legislatures have not
generally extended leniency to private, for-profit entities.
186 See, e.g., CONN. Gm. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a(e) (West 1991); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
260, § 2D (Law. Co-op. 1991).
187 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.22 (West 1994).
188 See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.091(B) (Anderson Supp. 1993).
189 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 260, §'2D (law. Co-op. 1991).
190 See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-301 (1989) (mandating five-year limitations period for
injury to real property caused by toxic substances "including products containing asbestos"
and three year limitations period for all other injuries to real property).
191 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a(e) (West 1991).




Connecticut statute extends this ten-year period to thirty years in as-
bestos property damage cases.
194
2. Revival Statutes
Seven states have passed "revival" statutes which resuscitate admit-
tedly stale claims and allow plaintiffs to bring suit within a specified
period after the effective date of the statute. In effect, these statutes
toll the statute of limitations for a limited time and create a window
during which plaintiffs may bring suit.195 Revival statutes are the most
controversial form of special asbestos legislation and have encoun-
tered several constitutional challenges.1 96 All but three of these stat-
utes limit their protection to public entities, leaving private building
owners to face the normal accrual rules.
197
The North Dakota revival statute is an example of legislation that
applies only to public bodies.198 It also illustrates the extent to which
legislatures have carefully preserved claims against asbestos defend-
ants when the plaintiff is a governmental entity. Enacted in 1993, the
statute sets August 1, 1997 as a deadline for parties to file lawsuits to
recover costs for abating asbestos in "public buildings." 99 Given that
the dangers of asbestos in buildings were generally known by the early
1980s, 20 0 the statute allows public entities in North Dakota a great deal
of time to investigate any claims they might have against asbestos man-
ufacturers and sellers. Moreover, the North Dakota statute broadly
194 Id. § 52-577a(e).
195 See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-30.1 (Supp. 1993) (revival untilJuly 1, 1990 for "any person
or entity, public or private," school districts, the state or its political subdivisions); IND.
CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-5.5 (Bums 1992) (1989 Ind. Acts 217-1989 § 9 applied the discovery
rule retroactively and revived claims otherwise barred as ofJune 30, 1989); LA_ REv. STAT.
ANN. § 9:5644 (West 1991) (revives stale claims until one year after the effective date of the
statute); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 260, § 2D(2) (Law. Co-op. 1992) (revival untilJuly 1, 1990
for the state or its political subdivisions); MmNN. STAT. ANN. § 541.22(2) (West Supp. 1994)
(revival untilJuly 1, 1990 for all building owners); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-47(2) (Supp.
1993) (revival until August 1, 1997 for suits involving public buildings); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-250.1 (Michie 1992) (revival untilJuly 1, 1990 for governmental entities and charita-
ble organizations).
196 See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. St.Joseph Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 880, 882 (Ga. 1989) (Georgia
revival statute constitutes a "special law" not permitted by state constitution); Security
Homestead Ass'n v. W.R. Grace & Co., 743 F. Supp. 456, 459 (E.D. La. 1990) (Louisiana
revival statute is not a "special law" prohibited by state constitution); City of Boston v.
Keene Corp., 547 N.E.2d 328, 334 (Mass. 1989) (Massachusetts revival statute does not
violate state constitution); Independent Sch. Dist. No. 197 v. W.R. Grace & Co., 752 F.
Supp. 286, 292-98 (D. Minn. 1990) (Minnesota revival statute does not violate state
constitution).
197 The three statutes applicable to non-public entities are: GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-30.1
(Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5644 (West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.22(2)
(West Supp. 1994).
198 N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-0147 (Supp. 1993).
199 Id.
200 See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
726 [Vol. 80:695
NOTE-ASBESTOS PROPERTY
defines "public building,"201 allowing this generous provision to reach
many parties. The motivation behind a special exemption statute like
North Dakota's is not difficult to comprehend. Indeed, another
North Dakota statute, passed in 1987, authorized the levying of special
property taxes to cover the costs of asbestos removal.20 2 The legisla-
ture, therefore, is keenly aware of the fiscal consequences of asbestos
abatement and has an interest in allowing asbestos property damage
suits brought by the state or its political subdivisions to proceed. In
other words, the motivation behind statutes like the North Dakota
statute is to revive lawsuits that seek to recapture costs otherwise borne
by the public.
3. Statutes that Specify Wen a Cause of Action Accrues
The third type of statute attempts to remove the legal wrangling
over when the cause of action accrues. Ohio is the only state with a
statute of this type, and it places the accrual date at the point of notifi-
cation by a governmental official or expert that the asbestos should be
abated.2 03 This legislation finds its, roots in the common-law discovery
rule.204 However, the statute does not rely on the elusive term "in-
jury," but specifically defines the injury, so that a plaintiff knows ex-
actly what he or she must discover.20 5 Applicable only to
governmental bodies,20 6 the Ohio statute is not especially solicitous
toward plaintiffs. Instead, it creates a formal rule that clearly states
when the lawsuit must be filed. Part III of this Note proposes an ac-
crual rule similar to the Ohio statute.
207
201 "Public Building" is defined as "any building owned by any county, city, township,
school district, park district, or any other unit of local government, the state or any agency,
industry, institution, board, or department thereof." N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-47(3)
(Supp. 1993).
202 See N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-15-17.1 (1993).
203 OHlo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.091(B) (Anderson Supp. 1993) (effective October 8,
1992). It reads:
A cause of action for any removal, measures, or reimbursement described
in divisions (A) (1) to (4) [asbestos property damage actions brought by
school districts] of this section accrues upon the date that the board of
education is informed by an official of a state, county, or local health de-
partment or of the United States environmental protection agency, the
Ohio environmental protection agency, or the industrial commission who
has conducted an inspection for asbestos or who has received test data con-
cerning asbestos located in a building or other structure that is owned by
the board of education, that asbestos or materials that contain asbestos in
any building or other structure that is owned by the board of education
should be removed from the building or other structure or be encapsulated
or otherwise maintained because the asbestos poses a health hazard or risk
to persons who use the building or other structure.
204 See discussion supra part I.B.2.
205 See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.091(B) (Anderson Supp. 1993).
206 See id.
207 See discussion infra part II.C.
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B. Statutes of Repose
Statutes of Repose offer another mechanism for time-barring the
plaintiff building owner's tort claim. State legislatures have passed
many types of statutes of repose, but relevant to asbestos property
damage litigation are statutes that apply to the construction or im-
provement of real property. Under the laws of most states, tort claims
arising out of the construction or improvement of real property are
time-barred after ten years.
20 8
1. How Statutes of Repose Work
Statutes of repose often operate similarly to statutes of limitations
in breach of warranty actions. Like the U.C.C.'s four-year statute of
limitations for warranty claims, statutes of repose specify a time period
within which a plaintiff can maintain a cause of action, and there is no
requirement of injury or of notice of that injury for the clock to begin
ticking.20 9 Instead, most statutes of repose mark "substantial comple-
tion" of the construction project as the starting point for the statute of
repose limitations period.210 Thus, the limitations period for both
U.C.C. statute of limitations and statutes of repose begins to run from
about the same date-the construction of the building-since a
breach of warranty cause of action accrues upon delivery of the asbes-
tos product.21' Remembering the trajectory of the typical asbestos
property damage case, construction of the building usually occurs
during the 1960s, whereas awareness of any risks from asbestos in
buildings likely comes only after 1978.212 Thus, plaintiffs may be
barred from seeking a remedy even if the alleged injury is one that
could not have been discovered in time. This reflects more than a
policy of discouraging stale claims, a policy that statutes of limitations
vindicate. Rather, statutes of repose reflect a conscious policy deci-
sion that certain defendants deserve the peace of mind that comes
with a close-ended limitations period.
213
208 See Andrew Alpern, Note, Statutes of Repose and the Construction Industry: A Proposal
for New York, 12 CAmtozo L. REv. 1975 (1991) (showing that 23 of 46 states with construc-
tion statutes of repose set a 10-year claims period).
209 See Concordia College Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 999 F.2d 326, 328 (8th Cir. 1993)
("regardless of when the injury is discovered... the cause will be deemed accrued no later
than ten years after substantial completion of the construction") (interpreting Minnesota
statute of repose), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 926 (1994).
210 See Alperm, supra note 208 (showing that 28 of 46 state statutes of repose set the
starting point at substantial completion).
211 See discussion supra part I.C.2.
212 See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.




(building constructed in 1970)
10 yr statute of repose
1946 1973 1980 1983 1984 1990
Widespread use Claim is National Most Property
of Asbestos in time-barred School Damage Suits
Buildings if SOR Class Filed after
1946-1973 applies Action 1984
2. Defendants Protected by Statutes of Repose
The actual impact of construction statutes of repose on asbestos
property damage litigation has been small. Building owners seeking
to recover abatement costs have generally chosen to sue asbestos man-
ufacturers for selling a defective product and have refrained from
targeting contractors, architects, or designers for negligently choosing
to install asbestos-containing materials.214 This choice may be in part
explained by plaintiffs' interest in pursuing deep pockets, but statutes
of repose best explain why actions against asbestos manufacturers are
plaintiffs' primary avenue of recovery.
Illinois has a typical construction statute of repose; it states that:
No action based upon tort, contract or otherwise may be brought
against any person for an act or omission of such person in the de-
sign, planning, supervision, observation or management of con-
struction, or construction of an improvement to real property after
10 years have elapsed from the time of such act or omission .... 215
Illinois courts have uniformly held that its statute of repose protects
parties like architects, engineers, and contractors, who essentially sell
their services, but not manufacturers of "standard products generally
available to the public and not custom designed for the project."2 16
Decisions from most other jurisdictions follow the interpretation
214 See Christensen & Larscheid, supra note 12, at 476-77 (defendants in asbestos prop-
erty damage cases almost exclusively members of the asbestos industry; architects and con-
tractors rarely sued); see also In re Asbestos Sch. Uitig., No. 83-0268, 1990 WL 73000, at *1
(E.D. Pa. May, 25, 1990) (defendants in nationwide class action are "members of the asbes-
tos industry as miners, manufacturers or suppliers").
215 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/13-214(b) (Smith-Hurd 1992).
216 See Illinois Masonic Medical Ctr. v. A C & S, 640 N.E.2d 31, 35 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994);
accord State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 24 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1994) (Illinois
construction statute of repose not applicable to manufacturer of asbestos fireproofing ma-
terial), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 298 (1994); Heider v. W.R. Grace & Co.-CONN., 815 F. Supp.
1137 (N.D. ll. 1993) (same); Landry v. Keene Corp., 811 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(same); Illinois v. Asbestospray Corp., 616 N.E.2d 652 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (Illinois statute
of repose not applicable to manufacturers of standard products).
19951 729
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
given to the Illinois statute by refusing to apply their statutes of repose
to manufacturers of mass-produced asbestos products.21 7 Construc-
tion statutes of repose are best understood as covering conduct that
involves the application of skill to a particular project. Indeed, the
plain language of the Illinois statute practically requires this interpre-
tation by the use of words like "design," "plan," and "management."
This language quite clearly excludes defendants that utilize a mechan-
ical process to fabricate standardized goods.
Most statutes of repose draw a distinction between defendants
who are sued for negligently providing services and those who are
sued for selling, in a commercial chain of distribution, defective prod-
ucts. However, a few statutes of repose include somewhat different
language from that of the Illinois statute and have been interpreted to
apply to remote manufacturers of asbestos products.2 18 The Minne-
sota statute of repose, for example, includes a provision for persons
"furnishing" materials for the improvement of real property.21 9 Ha-
waii's statute of repose similarly encompasses the "manufacturing and
supplying of material."220 Courts have held that both statutes apply to
asbestos manufacturers.22' The result has been that some plaintiffs,
217 See, e.g., Corbally v. W.R. Grace & Co., 993 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1993) (Texas statute
of repose does not apply to manufacturer of asbestos fireproofing material); Hebron Pub.
Sch. Dist. No. 13 v. United States Gypsum Co., 953 F.2d 398 (8th Cir. 1992) (North Dakota
statute of repose does not protect manufacturer of building materials); Wesley Theological
Seminary of the United Methodist Church v. United States Gypsum Co., 876 F.2d 119
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (District of Columbia statute of repose does not apply to manufacturers of
asbestos products); Dayton Ind. Sch. Dist. v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 800 F. Supp.
1430 (E.D. Tex. 1992) (Texas statute of repose does not apply to suppliers and manufac-
turers because they, unlike architects and builders, can maintain high levels of quality con-
trol of their products); Uricam Corp., N.V. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 739 F. Supp. 1493 (W.D.
Okla. 1990) (Oklahoma statute of repose does not apply to manufacturers of products);
Cinnaminson Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 552 F. Supp. 855 (D.NJ.
1982) (NewJersey statute of repose does not protect asbestos manufacturers); City of San
Diego v. United States Gypsum, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 876, 882 (Ct. App. 1994) (California stat-
ute of repose does not apply to manufacturers of allegedly defective products).
218 The Maryland statute of repose, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-108(a)
(1989), limits causes of actions for damages "resulting from the defective and unsafe condi-
tion of an improvement to real property." In First United Methodist Church v. United
States Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990), the
court interpreted the statute to preclude actions against manufacturers as well as "builders,
contractors, landlords and realtors." Id. at 864-65. It reasoned that nothing in the lan-
guage of the statute indicated an intent to limit the class of persons protected. The Mary-
land statute can be easily distinguished from statutes like the Illinois statute of repose,
which speak to "designing" and "management" activities. See supra notes 215-17 and ac-
companying text; see also School Bd. of Norfolk v. United States Gypsum Co., 360 S.E.2d
325, 327 n.3 (Va. 1987) (Virginia statute of repose applies to manufacturers of building
materials) (citing Cape Henry Towers, Inc. v. National Gypsum Co., 331 S.E.2d 476 (Va.
1985)).
219 MnNN. STAT. § 541.051(1)(a) (1992).
220 HAw. REv. STAT. § 657-8 (1983).
221 See In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., No. 83-0268, 1991 WL 3890 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 1991)
(Hawaii's statute of repose bars claims of certain Hawaiian school districts against asbestos
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absent a showing of fraudulent concealment,222 lose their rights to
recovery before they could ever have known-to sue.22 3
C. Sovereign Immunity: Nullifying the Statute of Limitations
Defense
The Introduction of this Note highlighted the fact that many of
the plaintiffs in the asbestos property damage litigation are govern-
ment entities. Defendants raising a statute of limitations defense will
therefore often find that sovereign immunity negates this defense.
22 4
Common-law sovereign immunity from statutes of limitations is classi-
cally stated as "nullum, tempus occurrit regi ('no time runs against the
sovereign')."225 At its root an absolute rule,22 6 sovereign immunity is a
powerful weapon against statute of limitations problems.
1. Entities Protected by Sovereign Immunity
State law varies greatly as to who or what is protected by sovereign
immunity. While the state itself clearly enjoys sovereign immunity,
political subdivisions such as counties, cities, or school districts occupy
a more uncertain position. The courts' willingness to in effect confer
product manufacturers); see also Metropolitan Fed. Bank v. W.R. Grace & Co., 999 F.2d
1257 (8th Cir. 1993) (Minnesota statute of repose bars suit against manufacturers of asbes-
tos products); Concordia College Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 999 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1993)
(same); Independent Sch. Dist. No. 197 v. W.R. Grace & Co., 752 F. Supp. 286 (D. Minn.
1990) (Minnesota statute of repose applicable in actions against asbestos manufacturers).
Similar to the Minnesota statute, the North Carolina statute of repose applies to the
"furnishing of materials," but the North Carolina Supreme Court in Forsyth Memorial
Hosp., Inc. v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 444 S.E.2d 423 (N.C. 1994) interpreted
the North Carolina statute of repose to exclude "remote manufacturers" of asbestos prod-
ucts. Id. at 427. The court reasoned that the statute would reach a "materialman" who
furnishes materials directly to the job site, but not a "remote manufacturer" who provides
the materials indirectly through the commerce stream. Id. Forsyth reinforces the trend of
limiting statutes of repose to defendants that sell services rather than products.
222 Plaintiffs confronted with statutes of repose like these are forced to allege fraudu-
lent concealment to toll the statute. See, e.g., Independent Sch. Dist. No. 197, 752 F. Supp. at
289-91. Plaintiffs can avoid dismissal only by successfully raising factual issues of defend-
ants' fraudulent conduct. A plaintiff's success is contingent upon how closely the court
chooses to scrutinize these allegations. See discussion supra part I.F.
223 The buildings at issue in Concordia Col/ege were "substantially" completed between
1957 and 1970. 999 F.2d at 328. Under Minnesota's 10-year statute of repose, the outer-
most limit for any claim for property damage would have been 1980, before the first asbes-
tos property damage action was filed.
224 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 572 A.2d 394 (D.C.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 880 (1990).
225 Id. at 400; see also Commonwealth of Va. v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 385
S.E.2d 865, 867 (Va. 1989).
226 See District of Columlia, 572 A.2d at 401. The court noted that sovereign immunity is
derived from "royal privilege." Id. It stated that the immunity apparently "survived the
Revolution more by force of habit or precedent than by reason." Id. The court cited
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) as affirming the continued vitality of sovereign
immunity, despite its lack of principled support.
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sovereign status on political subdivisions has been a key issue in asbes-
tos property damage litigation since most suits are filed by political
subdivisions, not the states.
Courts have unanimously held that sovereign immunity applies
when the state sues in its own name. In Commonwealth of Virginia v.
Owens-Coming Fiberglas Cop.,227 the Virginia Supreme Court decided
that sovereign immunity applied to the Commonwealth of Virginia "as
it did to the Crown."228 Courts applying other states' laws have also
found that states unquestionably have sovereign status. 229
On the other hand, political subdivisions must sometimes litigate
their claims as private building owners because they are not consid-
ered arms of the state for sovereign immunity purposes.230 For exam-
ple, the case law is split on the status of school districts, with most
courts holding that school districts may claim sovereign immunity. In
Tucson Unified School District v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp.,231 for in-
stance, the Arizona Supreme Court held that school districts, as polit-
ical subdivisions of the state, could benefit from sovereign immunity
to the same extent as the state itself. The court in Livingston Board of
Education v. United States Gypsum Co.2 32 reached a similar conclusion in
applying New Jersey law. It reasoned that school districts were "state
agencies fulfilling a state purpose" because "public education is a con-
stitutional obligation of the legislature."233 In contrast, the Court of
227 385 S.E.2d 865 (Va. 1989).
228 Id. at 867.
229 See, e.g., Tucson Unified Sch. Dist. v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 849 P.2d 790,
791 (Ariz. 1993) (sovereign immunity applies to state) (citing ARiz. Riy. STAT. ANN. § 12-
510 (1994) (certified question); Illinois v. Asbestospray Corp., 616 N.E.2d 652 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993) (state entitled to exemption from statutory time bar); Altoona Area Vocational
Tech. Sch. v. United States Mineral Co., 1988 WL 236355, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 1988)
(state has absolute right to invoke sovereign immunity) (dictum).
230 Compare Northampton County Area Community College v. Dow Chem., 566 A.2d
591 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (community college not a state entity and therefore subject to
statute of limitations), aff'd, 598 A.2d 1288 (Pa. 1991) with City of Phila. v. Lead Indus.
Ass'n, 994 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1993) (Philadelphia Housing Authority as agency of state is
absolutely immune from statute of limitations).
231 849 P.2d 790 (Ariz. 1993).
232 592 A2d 653 (NJ. App. Div. 1991).
233 Id. at 656. Most courts have refused to deny sovereign immunity solely because the
plaintiff is a political subdivision of the state. See, e.g., City of Wichita v. United States
Gypsum Co., 828 F. Supp. 851 (D. Kan. 1993) (sovereign immunity applicable ifmunicipal-
ity's claim arises out of governmental, rather than proprietary function); Dayton Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 789 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. Tex. 1992) (statute of
limitations does not apply to subdivisions of the state) (dictum); West Haven Sch. Dist. v.
Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 721 F. Supp. 1547 (D. Conn. 1988) (sovereign immunity
protects municipality if acting within governmental function); District of Columbia v.
Owen-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 572 A-2d 394 (D.C. 1989) (municipality protested by sover-
eign immunity), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 880 (1990); Board of Educ. of Chicago v. A, C & S,
Inc., 546 N.E.2d 580 (I11. 1989) (sovereign immunity protects board of education); Rowan
County Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 418 S.E.2d 648 (N.C. 1992) (same).
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Appeals of Ohio held in Beavercreek Local Schools v. Basic, Inc. 234 that
school districts and boards of education could not claim sovereign im-
munity. It insisted that only the state, as the sovereign, could claim an
exemption from the statute of limitations.23 5
2. The Sovereign May Waive Its Immunity
The sovereign, of course, may affirmatively subject itself to its own
statute of limitations.23 6 Defendants have argued that statutes of re-
pose manifest an intent on the part of legislatures to override sover-
eign immunity by creating vested rights protected by state
constitutions. In Commonwealth of Virginia v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas
Corp.,237 the Supreme Court of Virginia accepted this argument and
declared that sovereign immunity could not nullify rights protected by
the Constitution of Virginia.238 The court reasoned that a statute of
repose creates a right to be free from lawsuits after the end of the
repose period. It therefore held that the Virginia statute of repose239
abrogated the common-law immunity.2 40 Every other reported asbes-
tos property damage case, however, has rejected this notion of vested
rights2 4' and has held that statutes of repose do not indicate that the
sovereign has waived its immunity.2 42 These decisions have simply re-
fused to find a legislative intent in statutes of repose to create substan-
234 595 N.E.2d 360 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
235 Id. at 370.
236 Sovereign immunity is derived from the immunity initially enjoyed by the Crown.
It is therefore a common-law immunity that requires the legislature to positively subject
itself to its own statutes of limitations. See District of Columbia, 572 A.2d at 404 (sovereign
must specifically waive common-law immunity); Board of Educ. of Chicago, 546 N.E.2d at 603
(same); Rowan County Bd. of Educ., 418 S.E.2d at 652 (nullum tempus exempts state and
political subdivisions "unless the pertinent statute expressly includes the State").
237 385 S.E.2d 865 (Va. 1989).
238 Id. at 867-68.
239 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-250 (Michie 1992).
240 See id.
241 See Wesley Theological Seminary of the United Methodist Church v. United States
Gypsum, 876 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (applying District of Columbia law) (statute of
repose does not create substantive rights); Independent Sch. Dist. No. 197 v. W.R. Grace &
Co., 752 F. Supp. 286 (D. Minn. 1990) (same); cf City of Boston v. Keene Corp., 548
N.E.2d 328 (Mass. 1989) (running of statute of limitations does not create a vested right).
242 See District of Columbia v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 572 A.2d 394, 401 (D.C.
1989) ("sovereign enjoy[s] a common-law immunity from the operation of statutes of limi-
tations and reposd') (emphasis added), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 880 (1990); Illinois v. Asbestos-
pray Corp., 616 N.E.2d 652 (I1. App. Ct. 1993) (products liability statute of repose does
not override state's sovereign immunity); Rowan County Bd. ofEduc. v. United States Gyp-
sum Co., 418 S.E.2d 648 (N.C. 1992) (state immune from statutes of limitations and stat-
utes of repose when pursuing a governmental purpose); cf. Thomas A. Bowden, Comment,
Sovereign Immunity from Statutes of Limitations in Maryland, 46 MD. L. REv. 408, 416-17 (1987)
(noting that waivers of sovereign immunity are strictly construed).
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tive rights. Instead, the courts have interpreted statutes of repose as
leaving sovereign immunity intact.24
3
3. The Limits of Sovereign Immunity: Government Entity Must Seek
to Vindicate a "Public Right"
Most states impose a final limitation on a governmental entity's
ability to claim sovereign immunity: it must seek to vindicate a public
right.2 44 Traditionally, sovereign immunity was an absolute privilege
which rested upon the near absolute power of the Crown. Today, the
public policy of protecting "public rights" supports a more limited
form of sovereign immunity. Specifically, sovereign immunity pro-
tects the public from bearing the costs of negligent conduct by agents
of the sovereign when they fail to bring an action within the period
prescribed by the statute of limitations.2 45 Arguably, the innocent
public should not be forced to pay for the mistakes of absent-minded
officials.
Under this rule, the inquiry is whether the plaintiff's suit in fact
seeks to protect rights sufficiently "public" in nature.246 The key is
determining whether the right asserted is that of the "general public,
or whether it belongs only to the government or some small distinct
subsection of the public at large."247 The magnitude of the public
interest at stake can be measured both in terms of the number of
people affected and the degree to which individual interests are
threatened. In Board of Education of Chicago v. A, C & S, Inc., the Illi-
nois Supreme Court decided that not every member of the public
needed to be affected by the asserted right for it to qualify as a "public
right."248 Board of Education of Chicago involved claims brought by vari-
ous school districts to recover the costs of removing asbestos products
in school buildings.2 49 The court found significant the health risk to
students and workers posed by the presence of asbestos-containing
materials. 250 This concern, coupled with the broad-based interest of
243 The appropriateness and wisdom of sovereign immunity in the context of the as-
bestos property damage litigation are discussed in Part lI.C of this Note.
244 See, e.g., District of Columbia, 572 A.2d at 401; Board of Educ. of Chicago v. A, C & S,
Inc., 546 N.E.2d 580 (Ill. 1989); Rowan County Bd. of Educ., 418 S.E.2d at 654-55.
245 See District of Columbia, 572 A.2d at 401 (noting "legitimate public policy of preserv-
ing 'public rights, revenues, and property from injury or loss, by the negligence of public
officers'") (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132 (1938)); Ander-
son County Bd. of Educ. v. National Gypsum Co., 821 F.2d 1230, 1232 (6th Cir. 1987)
(applying Tennessee law) ("the public should not suffer because of the negligence of its
officers and agents") (quoting State ex rel Bd. of Univ. Sch. Lands v. Andrus, 671 F.2d 271,
274 (8th Cir. 1982)).
246 Board of Educ. of Chicago v. A, C & S, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 580, 600 (Iln. 1989).
247 Id. at 601.
248 546 N.E.2d 580 (Il1. 1989).
249 Id. at 583-84.
250 Id. at 602.
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recovering money that would otherwise come from the general funds
of the state, led the court to conclude that the plaintiffs were asserting
a "public" right and were entitled to sovereign immunity.251
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reached a similar re-
sult in District of Columbia v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.252 There the
District of Columbia sought to recover asbestos abatement costs for
various public buildings from asbestos manufacturers and sellers. Af-
ter considering the issue of the District's status as a sovereign, the
court considered whether the sovereign was suing to "vindicate" pub-
lic rights or rights "proprietary to the government alone."253 The
court argued that more than a "naked financial interest" was required,
but conceded that the public/proprietary line was difficult to draw
since the public must make good on any financial loss to the govern-
ment.2 54 However, as in Board of Education of Chicago, the alleged
health risks to building occupants enabled the court to conclude that
something more than a "financial interest" was at stake.2 55 Although
the District was ultimately seeking to "replenish its own funds," the
source of the expense (public health) proved important in the court's
finding that the District of Columbia could successfully assert sover-
eign immunity.
2 56
251 Id. The Asbestos Abatement Act, IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 105, para. 1-16 (Smith-Hurd
1993 & Supp. 1994), enacted by the Illinois state legislature, supported the court's deci-
sion. This is a comprehensive statute that directs school districts to determine whether
asbestos is present in their school buildings, and whether the asbestos-containing materials
pose an unreasonable health risk, and then to take steps to mitigate the situation. The
statute resulted from legislative findings that asbestos in buildings could pose a serious
health risk to occupants.
Paragraph 105/9 of the Asbestos Abatement Act designates funding sources for asbes-
tos abatement costs. School districts may apply to the state to receive funds from general
revenues. However, "proceeds from litigation against manufacturers, distributors and con-
tractors of asbestos products," must be sought, and any recovery will offset the state's con-
tribution to abatement costs. Board of Educ. of Chicago, therefore, can be seen as an easy
case for allowing sovereign immunity since the legislature had already expressed its opin-
ion, through the Asbestos Abatement Act, that asbestos in schools impacted the public
interest. Moreover, this statute makes it clear that any money recovered from the defend-
ants in Board of Edue. of Chicago would directly affect the costs borne by Illinois taxpayers.
252 572 A.2d 394 (D.C. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 880 (1990).
253 Id. at 406-07.
254 Id. at 407.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 410. Most other courts have determined that governmental entities suing for
asbestos abatement costs are asserting a public right. See, e.g., City of Wichita v. United
States Gypsum Co., 828 F. Supp. 851 (D. Kan. 1993) (public library is governmental func-
tion; auditorium where users pay fee is proprietary); Altoona Area Vocational Tech. Sch. v.
United States Mineral Prods. Co., No. 86-2498, 1988 WL 236355, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 13,
1988) (municipality or public corporation must seek to enforce right in exercise of a
"strictly governmental function;" plaintiff entitled to sovereign immunity because of duty
to minimize safety hazards in schools); Livingston Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum
Co., 592 A.2d 653, 656-57 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (school district acting in govern-
mental, not proprietary capacity); Rowan County Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum
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In sum, sovereign immunity may be something of a jungle, but
courts in jurisdictions that recognize sovereign immunity will probably
apply the doctrine in asbestos property damage cases when the plain-
tiff is a state or one of its political subdivisions.
257
HI
DIFFICULTIES WITH THE DISCOVERY RULE AND A PROPOSAL
Part I of this Note demonstrates that plaintiffs must rely on tort
theories of liability-i.e., negligence and strict liability-to recover in
asbestos property damage actions. However, the statute of limitations
is both a persistently litigated and a consistently losing issue for plain-
tiffs. This Part explores why the statute of limitations is a prominent
issue in the asbestos property damage litigation, and how it affects a
plaintiffs case on the merits. It also analyzes the accrual rules for tort
actions and argues for the widespread implementation of a formalized
discovery rule that one jurisdiction has already adopted.
A. The Difficulties in Filing a Timely Claim and How the Statute
of Limitations Shapes Plaintiffs Case on the Merits
The now prevalent discovery rule for tort claims allows plaintiffs
to bring suit after receiving notice of their injury.2 5 8 Mostjurisdictions
have adopted essentially the same formulation of the discovery rule;
the cause of action accrues upon the plaintiff s actual or constructive
knowledge of injury.2 59 Courts, in applying the discovery rule in as-
bestos property damage cases, face remarkably similar facts. Presuma-
bly, applying essentially the same rule to essentially the same facts
Co., 418 S.E.2d 648 (N.C. 1992) (board of education acting in pursuit of governmental
purpose); Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 607 A.2d 756, 762 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1992) (school district enforcing "strictly public rights").
257 A few courts have concluded that an action brought to recover asbestos abatement
costs does not assert a "public" right. See, e.g., Anderson County Bd. of Educ. v. National
Gypsum Co., 821 F.2d 1230 (6th Cir. 1987) (applying Tennessee law); In reAsbestos Sch.
Litig., 768 F. Supp. 146 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (applying Pennsylvania law); West Haven Sch. Dist.
v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 721 F. Supp. 1547 (D. Conn. 1988) (applying Connecti-
cut law); County of Johnson v. United States Gypsum Co., 580 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Tenn.
1984) (applying Tennessee law); see also City of Phila. v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 994 F.2d
112, 119-20 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying Pennsylvania law) (city as political subdivision of the
state must seek to enforce "strictly public right;" sovereign immunity inapplicable to
"claims arising out [of] a contract voluntarily entered into by both a government entity and
the defendant") (lead paint case).
The Supreme Court of Arizona eschewed the public/proprietary distinction alto-
gether in Tucson Unified Sch. Dist. v. Owens-CorningFiberglas Corp., 849 P.2d 790 (Ariz. 1993),
and concluded that the "nature of the plaintiff, not of the litigation" determines whether
sovereign immunity applies. Id. at 793. In other words, the court need only look to the
sovereign status of the governmental entity bringing the lawsuit.
258 See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
259 See discussion supra part I.B.2.
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would produce easily reconcilable outcomes. However, this simply
has not been the case.
1. Plaintiff's Theory of Liability Helps to Define "Injury"
Litigation strategy explains some of the inconsistent outcomes in
applying the discovery rule. As explained in Part I, the discovery rule
hinges on the open-ended term "injury." In asbestos property damage
cases, the "injury" for purposes of the statute of limitations has been
influenced by the definition of the "injury" for which the plaintiff is
seeking damages. In other words, the plaintiffs theory of liability-
the plaintiff's rationale for why the product is defective-influences
the time-bar issue.
In Kansas City 1,260 the Missouri Court of Appeals, on appeal from
the granting of defendant's motion for summary judgment, held that
tort causes of action did not accrue until asbestos fibers "contami-
nated" the building and the city acquired knowledge of that fact.
2 61
No one disputed that the city learned of the presence of and potential
dangers of asbestos well before the critical date-five years prior to
the filing of the complaint 262 However, plaintiff's theory of the case
was that it sustained property damage when the asbestos fibers were
released into the environment.2 63 Accordingly, the court found that
the "injury" the plaintiff needed to discover was contamination. Thus,
the city needed acquire a great deal of knowledge about its asbestos
problem before a cause of action would accrue. The plaintiff's theory
in effect elevated the level of knowledge required for its cause of ac-
tion to accrue, thereby avoiding summary judgment.26
At trial, the city changed its theory; it defined the alleged injury
as the presence of asbestos, not contamination.2 65 It is not difficult to
understand why the city changed its position. If the mere presence of
asbestos in the building constituted the property damage, then the
plaintiffs proof would have become much easier on its strict liability
claim. To show that it had been harmed, the city merely would have
to prove that the defendant's asbestos-containing products were in-
stalled in the building-a relatively easy task. On the other hand,
proving "contamination" would be more difficult. The plaintiff would
have to show that toxic asbestos fibers had entered the environment
and had created "an unreasonable risk of harm." 266 After making its
260 778 S.W.2d 264 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
261 Id. at 268.
262 Id. at 269-70.
263 Id. at 264-70.
264 Id. at 270.
265 Kansas City I, Nos. WD45130, WD45144, WD45276, 1992 WL 202510, at *5 (Mo.
Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1992).
266 See Kansas City I, 778 S.W.2d 264, 268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
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path to victory easier by changing its theory of liability, the city ob-
tained a jury verdict and judgment in its favor.
267
On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the judgment
for the city on statute of limitations grounds (Kansas City 17).268 The
Kansas City UI court noted the change in position and looked at the
facts relevant to the statute of limitations issue.2 69 With the change in
theory, the statute of limitations analysis changed. The focus shifted
away from the city's awareness of "contamination" to its knowledge of
the presence of asbestos in its buildings.270 The court held that the city
had clearly discovered the presence of asbestos, and hence its injury,
well before the critical date and entered judgment for the
defendant.
271
After the Court of Appeals of Missouri decided Kansas City 1, the
Missouri Supreme Court ordered the case transferred to its docket
(Kansas City II/).272 The Missouri Supreme Court held that Kansas
City I, which decided the statute of limitations issue in favor of the
plaintiff in the sunmnary judgment context, constituted the "law of the
case" and could not be relitigated unless there was "a change in the
issues or the evidence."273 The court found that the evidence before
the court of appeals in Kansas City I was essentially the same as the
evidence presented at trial. Consequently, the court held that the
"law of the case" precluded reconsideration of the statute of limita-
tions issue and affirmed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
The court in Kansas City I! also asserted, without explanation,
that "[o]bviously, the issues here and the issues in [Kansas City 1] re-
garding the running of the statute of limitations are precisely the
same."274 In this, the Missouri Supreme Court was simply wrong. As
Kansas City 11 explains, the plaintiff maintained at trial that its injury
was the presence of asbestos and recovered on that basis. 275 Kansas
City Illfailed to appreciate the difference between claiming "contami-
nation" and "presence" as the injury, and dismissed defendant's argu-
ment without really considering it. The court failed to understand the
advantage that the plaintiff gained by circumventing the statute of lim-
itations on one theory and recovering on the basis of another theory.
267 Kansas City Ii, Nos. WD45130, WD45144, WD45276, 1992 WL 202510, at *1 (Mo.
Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1992).
268 Id.
269 Id. at *1-5.
270 Id. at *5.
271 Id. at *6-*7.
272 Kansas City v. Keene Corp. (Kansas City ID), 855 S.W.2d 360 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
273 Id. at 366.
274 Id.
275 Kansas City II, Nos. WD45130, WD45144, WD45276, 1992 WL 202510, at *5 (Mo.
Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1992).
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Plaintiffs, in the end, cannot avoid the statute of limitations sim-
ply by pleading one position and arguing another at trial. When
plaintiffs make themselves into moving targets, defendants should be
able to re-assert the statute of limitations defense and gain either a
directed verdict or JNOV, depending on the particular facts of the
case. A court, such as the Missouri Court of Appeals in Kansas City H,
with a full awareness of the issues in the case, should find that the law
of the case does not prohibit reconsideration of the statute of limita-
tions question under these circumstances.
276
The plaintiffs substantive theories of liability, therefore, affect
how the plaintiff fares on the statute of limitations question. If the
plaintiff asserts that the mere presence of asbestos is its injury, then
the defendants will be ready to use the plaintiff's strategy against it,
arguing that the plaintiff discovered its injury much earlier on.
277
Since the plaintiff will almost always discover the presence of asbestos
before a specific defect in the asbestos product,278 the defendant will
be able to push back the date of plaintiff's knowledge of injury-the
key to a successful statute of limitations defense.
2. Asbestos Property Damage: A Creeping Problem for Building
Owners
The nature of the injury caused by asbestos in buildings contrib-
utes to the difficulty of complying with statutes of limitations. Asbes-
tos is a slow-acting agent, causing disease only after a long latency
period.279 Moreover, levels of asbestos fibers in buildings are usually
extremely low-a tiny fraction of OSHA's permissible exposure
limit-and often no higher than asbestos fiber levels outdoors.
280 Ex-
posure to asbestos in buildings, arguably, poses little or no actual
threat to health at any given time.28 ' Since building occupants rarely
276 The law of the case rule prevents relitigation of an issue already decided "within
the context of a single case." SeeJoan Steinman, Law of the Case: Judiial Puzzl in Consoli-
dated and Transferred Cases and in Mulitdistrict Litigation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 595, 597-98
(1987); see alsoJAcK H. FRrD.NrTL ET A-, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.1 (1985) (explaining law
of the case rule). The court in Kansas City L7 confirmed that this rule contemplates the
same issue having been previously decided.
277 See In reAsbestos Sch. Litig., No. 83-0268, 1991 WL 175848, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept 4,
1991) (considering defendants' motion for summary judgment on statute of limitations
grounds in response to plaintiffs' position that mere presence of asbestos is injurious).
278 See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
279 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
280 See CROSS, supra note 16, at 27 ("For buildings with wet-applied asbestos, nearly all
measured concentrations were less than 0.0006 f/cc, which approximated outdoor
levels."); Siegel, supra note 14, at 1164 n.170-74.
281 CRoss, supra note 16, at 29 ("risk from indoor asbestos is several times lower than
that presented by lightning, tornadoes, hurricanes, and any number of other natural dan-
gers[;] ... risk from exposure to low levels of asbestos is speculative and uncertain");
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become sick due to asbestos in buildings, 28 2 the building owner re-
ceives no clear warning signs that he or she has an asbestos prob-
lem.283 The plaintiff, therefore, perceives no clear point at which to
file a lawsuit, even though the plaintiff has arguably discovered his or
her injury.
The discovery rule as applied in asbestos property damage cases
has not proven to be a savior for plaintiffs as it has been in personal
injury litigation, where the manifestation of disease provides a clear
point at which to file a lawsuit.2 8 4 Asbestos in buildings is not only a
latent injury, but also a low-level injury. This combination causes
plaintiffs to postpone the filing of their complaints, even though they
are aware of their "injury" as it is defined by the law.
B. Vagueness of the Discovery Rule
Almost every jurisdiction has adopted the discovery rule for tort-
based causes of action for latent injuries.28 5 Yet in asbestos property
damage cases, the discovery rule has not proved to be an adequate
legal standard, despite its accommodation of plaintiffs with latent inju-
ries.2 8 6 Indeed, the discovery rule has yielded disparate results under
similar facts.28 7 The rule is nominally the same everywhere: actual or
constructive knowledge of injury triggers the limitations period.
288
However, the level and kind of knowledge required for the cause of
action to accrue varies among jurisdictions, with some courts focusing
on knowledge of the dangers of asbestos generally, and others looking
to the precise danger posed by the asbestos in the buildings at is-
sue.289 Furthermore, the plaintiffs position regarding the source of
the product's defect helps to define the "injury," which leads to diffi-
culties in determining what facts the plaintiff was supposed to dis-
cover, i.e., the mere presence of asbestos or contamination.2 90
These puzzles leave asbestos property damage plaintiffs in a posi-
tion of uncertainty. The discovery rule has led to such different out-
Siegel, supra note 14, at 1170-71 (low risk to health compared to many other ordinary life
activities such as riding a bicycle).
282 See CROSS, supra note 16, at 29.
283 Contrast the injury sustained when a fire caused by a defective product damages a
building. In this situation, even the most inattentive plaintiff would realize that he or she
has a cause of action.
284 Cf. Glimcher, supra note 8, at 501 (noting that the statute of limitations usually
does not pose problems in a traditional tort case where the injury is a broken bone).
285 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
286 See discussion supra part I.B.2.
287 See discussion supra part I.B.2.
288 See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 627 N.E.2d 1033, 1037
(Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
289 See discussion supra part I.B.2.
290 See discussion supra part IIIAL.
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comes that a building owner cannot know when he or she must sue or
lose his or her rights. Yet, the discovery rule was designed to avoid
difficulties in complying with the statute of limitations. When there is
no single event that clearly puts the plaintiff on notice that he or she
has been injured, such as diagnosis of an asbestos-related disease in a
personal injury suit, the discovery rule fails because of vagueness.
C. Proposal for a Particularized Discovery Rule
To say to an injured building owner that a tort cause of action
accrues when the injury is discovered is to say very little, given the
difficulty of grasping what is meant by the term "injury." A better rule
would remove the elusive term "injury" from the formula and detail
the specific facts that a plaintiff must know in order for the statute of
limitations period to begin to run. This is, indeed, an unabashed call
for a bright-line rule to govern asbestos property damage actions, and
a clear rejection of the flexible discovery rule that would govern all
other products liability litigation. Certainly, it would be onerous and
pointless to formulate a particularized rule for every product that en-
genders litigation. However, the number of these cases, coupled with
the persistence of the statute of limitations issue, justifies special
treatment. 291
1. Attempts by Courts and Legislatures to Formulate a Particularized
Discovery Rule
Missouri courts, after deciding several statute of limitations ques-
tions in asbestos property damage suits, have developed a particular-
ized common-law rule that attempts to narrow Missouri's normal
discovery rule.292 Under the Missouri rule, the plaintiff must have
"knowledge of a substantial and unreasonable risk of harm" to build-
291 Particularized rules in mass tort litigation are far from unprecedented. Indeed,
when a product engenders tremendous litigation, courts, with good reason, adopt new
rules that address the unique problems raised by the litigation. The DES litigation saw a
dramatic departure from normal tort principles on causation, a change the courts imposed
to avoid injustice to the many victims of a defective product. See Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607
P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (adopting market share liability), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
The Agent Orange Litigation required a similar change in plaintiffs burden of proof. See
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), affid, 818 F.2d
145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988). In a similar vein, courts have used
special procedures to govern asbestos personal injury cases, such as the Judicial, Panel for
Multidistrict litigation's decision to consolidate all such cases pending in federal courts for
pretrial management. See Stephen Labaton, judges' Panel, Seeing Court Cisis, Combines
26,000Asbestos Cases, N.Y. TIMEs,July 30, 1991, Al. In sum, fairness, judicial economy and
the need for comprehensible legal standards are among the bases that motivate courts to
develop particularized rules.
292 See discussion supra part I.B.3.
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ing occupants before a cause of action accrues.2 95 Yet, even this rule
fails to alleviate much of the uncertainty over when a building owner
should sue. The risk from asbestos in almost any building is relatively
small.294 Therefore, even the most dangerous buildings would be on
the margins of what an ordinary person would call an "unreasonable
risk." Indeed, a growing number of experts feels that most asbestos in
buildings poses little risk and should be left undisturbed.2 95
Keeping in mind that, at bottom, the reason for the lawsuit is the
recovery of clean-up CoSts, 2 9 6 this Note proposes that discovery of the
need to remove or maintain asbestos should start the statute of limita-
tions clock ticking. Requiring the discovery of an "injury" or an "un-
reasonable risk of harm" simply confuses the issue. The Ohio statute
regarding school district actions concerning asbestos follows this ap-
proach. In addition, it adds an important requirement-that the
school board learn of the need to abate asbestos from a governmental
official. 297 This official may be a member of the state or federal envi-
ronmental protection agency or an industrial commission and must
base his or her decision on an inspection of the building and/or a
review of test results.2 98 A cause of action accrues when the school
board learns that (1) the asbestos must be removed or maintained
because it (2) poses a "health hazard or risk" to building occupants.2 99
Importantly, the Ohio statute does not ask the school board to assess
whether a "health hazard or risk" exists, but instead requires an expert
in the field to draw this conclusion.
300
2. Proposed Rule
This Note proposes a rule that tracks the provisions of the Ohio
statute, although with some significant deviations. 30 Under this pro-
293 See Clayton Ctr. Assocs. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 861 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Mo. Ct. App.
1993).
294 The risk of death before reaching age 65 from exposure to asbestos in buildings
has been estimated as three times less than the risk of being struck by lightening, and seven
times less than the risk of drinking New York City tap water. See Siegel, supra note 14, at
1171 n.207.
295 See id. at 1144 (discussing the clean-up debate).
296 See discussion supra part lA.
297 OHIo Rv. CODE ANN. § 2305.091 (Anderson Supp. 1993).
298 Id. § 2305.091(B).
299 Id.
300 Id.
501 One other jurisdiction, Louisiana, has modified the free-form discovery rule, but
this rule fails to address the process concerns analyzed in this Note. The Louisiana statute
suspends the statute of limitations until the completion of abatement work or until the
building owner discovers the "identity of the manufacturer of the materials which require
abatement." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:5644 (West 1991). This statute avoids a discovery rule
predicated on knowing the existence of an "injury." However, the first prong is far too
indulgent, and the second prong may postpone the running of the statute of limitations
indefinitely, an outcome that greatly undermines the policy of repose. First, suspending
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posed rule, tort claims would accrue when an expert informs the
plaintiff of (1) the presence of asbestos in the building, (2) the gen-
eral dangers of asbestos, and (3) the need to maintain or remove the
asbestos-containing material. Like the Ohio statute, the key to this
proposal is the requirement that the plaintiff discover his or her injury
through an expert's assessment of the asbestos in the building. The
virtue of this requirement is that a building owner is not put in the
position of deciding, on the basis of observations made by lay people,
whether "injury" has been sustained. Inspecting, evaluating, and man-
aging asbestos is a difficult technical matter. Because asbestos in an
inert state does not always differ in appearance from asbestos that is
friable and should be abated, discovering the injury demands expert
assistance.3
02
The requirement of notification by an expert serves an eviden-
tiary function. Information communicated to a building owner on
this matter will almost assuredly be in writing, and it will be stated in a
way that draws conclusions from data and advises a course of action.
Expert reports will therefore be tangible proof of what the plaintiff
understood about its asbestos problem, thereby facilitating the statute
of limitations determination both at trial and at the summary judg-
ment stage.3 03
The rule proposed in this Note diverges from the Ohio approach
by allowing a cause of action to accrue upon notification by experts
from private firms as well as from government agencies. This diver-
gence is natural and necessary, lest plaintiffs benefit from an overly
solicitous rule. Whereas this Note proposes a rule applicable to ac-
tions brought by both private and public building owners, the Ohio
statute only applies to school districts.30 4 The Ohio requirement that
the expert be part of a government agency may be appropriate when
that agency is charged with inspecting the very buildings at issue in
litigation. However, since commercial building owners and some pub-
lic entities routinely rely on private firms to inspect and monitor as-
the statute of limitations until the completion of abatement work is unnecessary. Fairness
only dictates that the building owner be clearly put on notice that she should sue. Cer-
tainly, the start of abatement work would qualify as clear notice. Second, suspending the
statute of limitations until the building owner becomes aware of the identity of the manu-
facturer could result in lawsuits long after learning of an asbestos problem in the building
or even years after abatement work has been completed. The Louisiana statute thus clearly
fails to eliminate stale claims, the raison d'etre for statutes of limitations.
302 See 1985 Hearings, supra note 29, at 230-35 (written statement of Wayne Tansil, Di-
rector of Special Projects, the Pickering Firm) ("asbestos identification and exposure as-
sessment isn't simple").
303 See Kansas City I, 778 S.W.2d 264, 269-70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (discussing expert
reports and plaintiff's knowledge of injury).
304 OHio Rxv. CODE ANN. § 2305.091 (Anderson Supp. 1993).
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bestos, 305 notice from these experts should trigger the statute of
limitations. Finally, fairness requires that the Ohio rule be expanded
to include private experts so that plaintiffs cannot prolong the filing
of the lawsuit. Triggering the statute of limitations only upon notifica-
tion by government experts would relieve plaintiffs of their duty to
bring a timely action, disappointing the legitimate expectations of as-
bestos defendants.
On the other hand, one could critique the proposed rule as un-
fair to defendants by allowing plaintiffs to ignore notice given by non-
experts in order to prolong the filing of the lawsuit. Nevertheless,
expanding the rule proposed by this Note to incorporate knowledge
gained from non-experts would make it similar to the free-form dis-
covery rule, which this Note has previously criticized.306 In addition,
non-experts would rarely be able to accurately determine (1) the pres-
ence of asbestos, (2) the dangers of asbestos generally, and (3) the
need to abate the asbestos. 307 A credible recommendation to main-
tain or remove asbestos-containing material would have to be made by
someone with the training and experience to test the composition of
building materials and to evaluate the health risk posed by asbestos-
containing material. Building managers, custodians, or building oc-
cupants without this expertise would be unable to advise a building
owner whether to undergo asbestos abatement.
The rule proposed in this Note would allow a cause of action to
accrue only after the plaintiff building owner has received reasonable
notice of its claims. Rather than looking to the plaintiff s knowledge
of "contamination," this rule focuses on the plaintiff's awareness of
the need to take affirmative steps to correct a potential problem with
the building. Only at this point, does the plaintiff know that asbestos
in the building has caused, or will cause, loss. Knowing that the asbes-
tos-containing materials are "friable," or that small numbers of invisi-
ble fibers are in the air, may mean very little to a building owner. On
the other hand, knowing that it must take steps, however small, to
remove or maintain asbestos-containing material, should alert the
plaintiff to investigate its legal rights.
3. Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity
This Note supports subjecting school boards and other govern-
ment entities to the same statute of limitations faced by private plain-
tiffs. Although the Ohio statute subjects school boards to the statute
305 See 1985 Hearings, supra note 29, at 230 (written statement of Wayne Tansil) (dis-
cussing firm's asbestos abatement consultation work for over 800 facilities).
306 See discussion supra I.B.2.
307 See supra text accompanying note 299.
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of limitations, 308 other jurisdictions have given school boards immu-
nity from statutes of limitations under sovereign immunity doc-
trine.309 When school boards or other governmental entities can
escape the statute of limitations altogether, sovereign immunity works
injustice on defendants and prolongs the asbestos crisis in our
courts.310 These concerns should override the traditional "public pol-
icy of preserving the public rights, revenues, and property from injury
and loss."3 1 ' This Note would extend its proposed rule to all building
owners, governmental and private. A uniform, comprehensible and
judicially manageable legal standard should govern all asbestos prop-
erty damage actions. A formal discovery rule best balances fairness to
the plaintiff and defendant and makes litigation over the statute of
limitations issue less likely.
Of course, abrogating sovereign immunity in asbestos property
damage cases would require a decision by the legislatures, not by the
courts.312 For state legislatures to subject themselves to the same stat-
ute of limitations that private parties must face would be a significant
public policy choice. Although they have generally declined to waive
their built-in advantage, legislatures have many reasons to make an
exception to sovereign immunity in the asbestos property damage liti-
gation. First, the uncertainty surrounding potential liability from as-
bestos litigation affects the future of non-bankrupt defendants. 313
Without some limitations period, school boards and government enti-
ties could litigate these cases into the twenty-first century. Second,
allowing already old cases to grow significantly older would unfairly
prejudice defendants. Government entities could strategically wait for
memories to fade and evidence to be lost to impede defendants' abil-
ity to present their case. Finally, courts need to achieve closure of all
asbestos litigation. Cases languishing in court for ten years and more
is an embarrassment to the judiciary, as well as a monument to ineffi-
ciency.314 Applying a fair and uniform accrual rule would create an
endpoint to the asbestos property damage litigation.
308 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.091 (Anderson Supp. 1993).
309 See supra notes 230-34 and accompanying text.
310 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
311 United States v. Hoar, 26 F. Cas. 329, 330 (G.C.D. Mass. 1821) (No. 15,373) (Story,
J.).
312 See supra notes 236-43 and accompanying text.
313 Cf. BRODEUR, supra note 27, at 283-320 (describing the Manvifle bankruptcy
proceedings).
314 See In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., No. 83-0268 (E.D. Pa. filed Jan. 17, 1983). This case




The statute of limitations has been a central issue in the asbestos
property damage litigation. It has shaped plaintiffs' litigation strate-
gies and has been a repeated source of confusion in our courts. The
importance of these second-wave asbestos suits in terms of the money
at stake and the impact on government bodies, such as school boards,
argues for a comprehensible and fair rule to govern the running of
the statute of limitations. In general, this Note supports the discovery
rule because of its fairness to plaintiffs in latent injury cases; indeed,
almost all courts have accepted this rule for tort-based causes of ac-
tion. This Note also proposes a particularized discovery rule applica-
ble to asbestos property damage actions, where actual or constructive
knowledge of the need to abate asbestos starts the statute of limita-
tions clock ticking. This rule removes the confusion inherent in a
court's determination of when the plaintiff learned of its "injury." Fi-
nally, this Note argues for an abrogation of sovereign immunity in
asbestos property damage cases on the grounds that a particularized
discovery rule makes compliance with the statute of limitations easy
and that the asbestos crisis must not be prolonged any further.
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